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iv Agricultural development banks: the forgotten half of rural finance? 
 
1. Agricultural  development  banks: the forgotten half of rural 
finance? 
The issue of agricultural development banking discussed in this paper has a history to it. 
For a hundred years or more, until the middle of the 20
th century, a small number of 
agricultural banks existed outside of Europe. During that period, 15.5% of the banks in the 
AgriBank-Stat inventory, were established.
1 Some seem to have led an inconspicuous life, 
like the predecessors of the Agricultural Cooperative Bank in Syria and the Agricultural 
Credit Corporation in Jordan, established in 1888
2. Others, like the predecessor of Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia dating back to 1885, were at the center of lively debates over such 
issues as centralized vs. decentralized rural banking; the role of the government as a 
decision-maker vs. the people themselves, perhaps organized in cooperatives; and 
banking in kind vs. banking in money.
3 However, whatever lessons might have been 
drawn from that experience appear to be lost in history.  
  
For three decades, roughly from the 1950s to the 1970s, agricultural development banks 
(AgDBs) were considered a panacea. During that period, 50% of the agricultural banks in 
the AgriBank-Stat inventory were established. At first, they were to finance progress in 
high-yielding agriculture and to generate excess revenues to be invested in the emerging 
industrial sector. Next, poverty alleviation through smallholder credit was added to their 
mandate. Donors were eager to support them with soft loans for credit lines, repayable 
over 40 years, and with technical assistance. Donor experts assisted in preparing and 
implementing the key components of the development banking concept: government 
ownership, the enactment of special AgDB laws and exemption from central bank 
supervision, budgetary allocations and external credit lines as sources of funds, 
subsidized interest rates, targeted credit, and, in a later phase, a poverty focus frequently 
combined with group lending. However, most AgDBs turned out to be a flop. Instead of 
producing income to be profitably reinvested, they disbursed funds that were not repaid, 
generated losses that were a drain on public resources, and, last but not least, missed 
their target group and their purpose. In their downfall, they frequently pulled with them 
large numbers of cooperatives which they had used as credit channels. One of the chief 
reasons for their failure was cogently summarized in a book title: Undermining Rural 
Development with Cheap Credit (Adams et al., 1984). 
 
For the next two decades, the 1980s and 1990s, many donors withdrew their support to 
AgDBs, among them the World Bank (Giehler, 1999). Surprisingly, this did not keep 
governments from establishing new agricultural banks; 34% of the banks in the inventory 
                                                  
1 Most of the figures reported here are based on 58 agricultural banks on which sufficient data exist 
in the AgriBank-Stat inventory, out of a total of 75 institutions listed. The AgriBank-Stat inventory 
has been created by the Food and Agricuture Organization FAO and the German Technical 
Cooperation GTZ and is hosted on FAO’s homepage   
(http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsm/banks/index.htm) 
2 The Ottoman Agricultural Bank, from which the two banks originated, had its head office in 
Damascus and three branches in what is today Jordan (see chapter 6.1). (Seibel 2002) 
3 Many of the issues today discussed in rural, micro and agricultural finance already existed at the 
beginning of the 20
th century in Indonesia, under Dutch colonialism. For a recent summary of the 
rich literature see Steinwand 2001. 
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were established during that period. Contrary to the expectations of the modernization 
theorists of the 1960s, the economic miracle of Germany, partially based on the transfer of 
capital through development banks, was not repeated in any developing country. Some 
regional development banks and multilateral institutions continued using them as 
channels for their credit lines, but with the unfortunate result that this made many AgDBs 
and recipient countries poorer, not richer. At the end, a considerable number of AgDBs 
were technically bankrupt; many were closed, particularly in Africa; some were privatised, 
as in Latin America; yet, for political reasons, many were kept going through perpetual 
budgetary allocations, particularly in the Near East, but also elsewhere.  
 
AgDBs disappeared from the agenda of international conventions and workshops, as 
attention shifted from agricultural credit to rural finance, proposing (i) savings as a service 
and source of funds and (ii) portfolio diversification by including rural microentrepreneurs, 
informal traders and other customers as additional new market segments. Institutionally, 
AgDBs were declared unsuitable to cope with the new rural finance agenda and were 
subsequently ignored. Instead, two new topics came up: financial systems development 
and microfinance (The World Bank 1989; Seibel 1996). Even informal financial institutions 
appeared more promising than AgDBs (Adams & Fitchett 1994; Ghate 1992; Kropp et al. 
1989; Seibel & Marx 1987). As a result – paraphrasing an article on rural savings by 
Robert Vogel (1984) –, agricultural banks became the forgotten half of rural finance. 
 
So, the concluding question is: What should happen to the remaining agricultural banks: 
Ignore them, close them or reform them? Ignoring the issue may be the worst strategy, 
throwing good money after bad, though this is a strategy many governments have chosen 
confronted by political pressure in favor of the banks. 
 
But why not just close the remaining AgDBs if they are so underperforming? There are 
several reasons why we should take a fresh look at agricultural banks. The first is a moral 
one: If donor experts were responsible for the flaws in the design of the banks, as was 
frequently the case, they should now, enlightened by 40 years of development banking 
experience, not discard them without due diligence. 
 
The second is inspired by theory: If a credit bias is the problem, why not solve that 
problem by mobilizing savings deposits as the main source of funds and at the same time 
a much demanded service to the rural population? If cheap credit is the problem, why not 
introduce market rates of interest? If governance is the problem, why not find alternatives 
to government ownership or other solutions to political interference? If financial repression 
is the problem, why not engage in a policy dialogue and adjust the legal and policy 
framework? These issues may not be entirely unrelated: As cheap credit together with a 
credit bias create dependency on public resources and invite interference by the 
government and politicians, savings mobilization as the main source of funds and the 
deregulation of interest rates on deposits and loans might eliminate the material basis for 
government interference.  
 
The third is a pragmatic one: Even if the quality of their service is low, their outreach can 
be vast, in some countries in the millions and even tens of millions; and there is no 
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immediate alternative available, most certainly not in the form of credit NGOs. Also, large 
amounts of money have been invested in the infrastructure of development banks, some 
of them with thousands of branches and sub-branches and tens of thousands of staff 
members. It would be a great loss if the branches were closed, and a great gain if they 
could be turned into profitable enterprises. In addition, profitable AgDBs might have 
access to capital markets because of their size in equity and liabilities in order to mobilize 
long-term funds by bond issues. Small financial institutions do not have this opportunity 
and therefore lack this funding source being crucial for agricultural long-term lending. 
 
The fourth reason is the unsolved problem of financial services in rural areas. After closing 
AgDBs in several countries, specially in Latin America, the gap has never been closed by 
new financial institutions, such as the promising microfinance institutions. Microcredit 
turned out to be an appropriate credit technology in urban areas to finance small scale 
trading activities but only in very few cases it could provide sufficient or appropriate 
products in rural areas or for agricultural production. Thus, the notion that AgDBs hinder 
or undermine the development of new credit providers in rural areas has never been 
evidenced at least in Latin America. 
 
The fifth, and most convincing reason, is a historical one: Not all AgDBs have failed. In a 
number of countries, unviable agricultural banks with insignificant outreach and poor 
service are a thing of the past. In others, there is a keen awareness, at least in the 
agricultural banks and in some quarters of the administration, that things must change. 
But most importantly, under conditions of a conducive policy environment, there have 
been spectacular reforms in a number of countries. Let us examine them first before 
giving up on agricultural banks!  
 
Since around 2000, there is now a new interest in the reform issue: cautious and gradual, 
but continual. Several multilateral, bilateral and international organizations have been 
involved: FAO, IFAD, the World Bank, GTZ, a CGAP Working Group on Agricultural 
Development Bank Reform, and, with support from IFAD and GTZ, the regional 
agricultural credit associations AFRACA, APRACA and NENARACA (CGAP, 2004, 
AFRACA, 2004).  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the introductory chapter, we have given an 
overview over the background and the crucial issues. This is followed by a confidence 
building section (with the evidence presented only in chapter 5). After briefly listing the 
flaws and ills of the old world of agricultural credit, we outline the new consensus on rural 
finance, which overlaps with that on microfinance, and list the major lessons taught by 
international experience in a condensed format. Finally, we deal with the issue whether 
agricultural finance is really as risky and unprofitable as it is usually depicted, particularly 
by those who stay away from it. 
 
In chapter 3, we present some puzzling insights into agricultural finance from both a 
supply-side and a demand-side perspective, pre-empting some of the evidence given in 
chapter 6. There is the usually reported lack of funds in banks and lack of finance among 
the potential investors (such as farmers, microentrepreneurs, commodity processors and 
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traders) in some cases; but also the abundance of funds and shortage of investment 
opportunities in others. 
 
In chapter 4, we set the scene for the subsequent presentation of data, coming back to 
the basic issue of the introduction: ignoring, closing or reforming agricultural banks. In 
Chapter 5 we present the statistical facts as given in the AgriBank-Stat  inventory of 
agricultural banks, amply illustrated by presentations of pre-reform, reforming and 
reformed agricultural banks in Chapter 6. 
 
In the final chapter, we present the new recent initiatives at agricultural bank reform, the 
role played by the agricultural bank associations, and a planning framework for policy and 
decision makers. 
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2.  The old and the new world of development finance 
2.1.  The old world of agricultural credit 
During the 1950s and 60s and well into the 70s, when donor money flowed abundantly 
into development banks, there was agreement in the donor community on how to deal 
with low levels of agricultural productivity:  
 
Given the level of poverty in the underdeveloped world, international experts 









Given the level of illiteracy, international experts also advised government 
administrations to guide production through directed credit, with a strong emphasis 
on self-reliance in staple crops, supplemented by an emphasis on cash crops for 
export. 
 
Thus, governments owned AgDBs, subsidized interest rates and prompted production 
decisions. In many cases, crops were planted because of the availability of inputs 
including credit, not because soils were suitable and production was profitable. As a result 
commercial thinking was lacking, both in agricultural production and agricultural finance. 
Credit was scarce and was grabbed by a small number of bigger farmers; outreach to the 
poor remained far behind expectations. Frequently, credit was provided to the wrong 
people (e.g., with political connections) at the wrong time (e.g., after the planting season) 
for the wrong purposes (e.g., administratively defined uses). Neither bank staff nor the 
farmers took agricultural credit seriously, which had evolved into a political affair. 
Repayment rates turned out to be abysmally low – except when tied directly to outgrower 
schemes and marketing boards - and became an eternal drain on government and donor 
resources. In the process, banks, farmers and agricultural credit were discredited. For 
decades, financial repression has undermined the evolution of a diversified financial 
sector with cost-effective services available to all segments of the population. The rural 
and urban poor in the developing world have been the most affected. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, a consensus gradually evolved on the negative effects of financial 
repression: 
 
Rural areas have been severely underbanked; an effective rural financial 
infastructure is largely absent in many countries. 
Preferential credit programs have tended to curtail - rather than expand - outreach 
to small farmers and low-income people. These programs have undermined the 
health of agricultural development banks, cooperatives, and other institutions 
serving as credit channels.  
Interest rate regulation has prevented institutions from covering their costs, and 
had a severe, negative impact on access to financial services among the poor. 
In many countries, agricultural credit has all but dried up. 
A credit bias of government-owned development banks has led to a lack of 
savings deposit facilities, which are a service priority among many of the poor. 
Commercial banks collect savings in rural centers and siphon them off into urban 
areas. 
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Informal financial institutions, which are formed by the local people through self-




In many countries, there is a lack of suitable legal forms for local financial 
institutions (particularly non-mutualist local financial institutions, such as equity-
based rural banks). This has prevented informal institutions from upgrading to 
registered local financial institutions. Thus, they remain small and isolated. 
Rural and other microfinance institutions are not supervised, there are no 
prudential standards, and no enforcement mechanisms. This has had serious 
negative consequences, particularly for:  
-  agricultural development banks, many of which are technically bankrupt; 
-  cooperatives and credit unions, which were used as credit channels, 
resulting in widespread inefficiency, corruption and the breakdown of 
whole networks;  
-  credit NGOs, which have been donor-driven, are barred from mobilizing 
deposits from the public, and have shown a limited potential, except when 
transformed into a bank; 
-  overall rural financial intermediation has been impeded. 
2.2.  The emerging consensus on the new world of rural and microfinance 
In an increasing number of countries, there have been notable changes to varying 
degrees from the old world of directed credit to a new world of sustainable institution 
building. In this new world, governments make determined efforts to create conducive 
policy environments with new legal forms for local financial institutions, deregulated 
interest rates, and prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions. 
 
Responding to the demands of their customers, institutions undergo reform and provide 
an array of savings and credit products for a wide range of income-generating activities, 
thereby generating the loanable funds and the profits needed for expansion. Many 
agricultural and rural banks, cooperatives and other MFIs have learned to manage their 
risks. The transition from the old to the new world of development finance, as described in 
the following matrix, is a challenging framework to any institution and donor agency 
aiming at sustainable development.  
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Table 1: From the old world of directed credit to the new world of financial systems 
development and institution-building  
 
  The old world of directed credit 
 
The new world of institution-
building 
Policy environment   Banks as input providers  Banks as profit oriented actors 
within a market driven financial 
system 
Legal framework  Public owned or public financed financial 
institutions without supervision; 
governments keep distressed institutions 
alive 
Supervised private commercial 
institutions, member based co-




Supply-driven Demand-driven   
Institutional focus  Monopoly institutions   Various competing financial 
institutions 
Clients perceived as:  Beneficiaries Customers 
Selection of clients  Targeting by donors and governments  Self-selection 
Outreach  Banking as public service  Banking with clients 
Loan products  Specified targeted loan schemes for single 
purposes 
Cash-flow based credit 
Other products  Lack of savings facilities  Universal banking 
Non-formal FIs   Millions of informal MFIs ignored  Opportunities for mainstreaming  
Semiformal FIs/NGO  No standards, no deposit mobilization  Microfinance boom in urban and 
periurban areas; transformation 




Unsupervised, ruined by governments Self-reliance 
AgDBs  Highly subsidized; deposit mobilization not 
allowed 
Reforms towards autonomy and 
viability 
Rural banks (RBs)  Lack of opportunities for private RBs   Legal framework for private RBs 
Commercial banks  Forced to provide funds  Some voluntary down-scaling of 
products to poorer client 
segments 
 
The transition to a new world of finance, as promising as it looks, has only just started. 
Neither does it cover all developing countries; not does it cover all institutions and spheres 
of the economy in those countries where it has commenced. In most countries, the 
situation is highly complex and full of contradictions, for example: 
 
failing and prospering institutions may exist side by side;   ♦ 
♦ 
♦ 
governments pass laws on market-driven institutions, yet continue subsidizing the 
interest rates of others;  
agricultural development banks and commercial banks – facing high minimum 
reserve requirements and high T-bill rates and plagued by weak lending 
technologies - may produce huge amounts of excess liquidity, yet the government 
borrows money from international donors and increases its external debts.  
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In sum, despite promising beginnings, rural areas and agricultural finance have been least 
touched by these changes. Once it was savings
4, now it is agricultural credit that is the 
forgotten half of rural finance. There exists an enormous underutilized potential!  
2.3.  Lessons taught by international experience: What matters in development 
finance? 
Due to the overall failure of donor-driven directed credit, the emphasis in development 
policy has shifted to (rural) financial systems development and the building of self-reliant, 
sustainable institutions. Regardless of ownership, type of institution, rural or urban sphere 
of operation and target group, financial institutions in developing countries, with the 
exception of apex banks, ultimately have to accomplish the following: 
 





have their loans repaid 
cover their costs from their operational income 
earn enough profits to offset the effects of inflation  
finance their expansion from their profits and commercial funds mobilized. 
 
Box 1: Fundamentals of sustainable rural finance 
Sustainable financial institutions mobilize deposits or other commercial resources, provide 
financial services according to demand, cover their costs from their operational income, have 
their loans repaid, make a profit, and finance their expansion from deposits and retained 
earnings. Resource mobilization comprises equity, savings deposits, retained earnings and 
commercial borrowings, augmented by external resources such as soft loans and grants. Of 
these resources, three are fundamental to self-reliance and dynamic growth: savings deposits 
and equity including retained earnings. Financial services comprise credit for various purposes 
and savings deposit facilities; they may further include money transfer, check clearing and 
insurance. Insurance may serve the triple function of borrower protection, loan protection and 
resource mobilization. Sustainable institutions need an appropriate legal status which authorizes 
them to carry out all these functions; and they need to be properly regulated and effectively 
supervised. Financial systems development comprises processes of establishing a conducive 
regulatory environment (including a legal framework, prudential norms and effective 
supervision), an adequate infrastructure of viable small and large financial institutions, adequate 
demand-oriented financial products and good operational practices.  
 
In addition to these fundamentals, a wealth of lessons have been taught by international 
experience, but not always learned by donors and governments. The lessons are complex 
and are presented below in a condensed form.  
 
What matters to the poor: 
♦ 
                                                
First of all, client experience matters. Clients have experienced in projects that 
credit can make them poorer or richer 
 
4 Robert Vogel, Savings Mobilization: The Forgotten Half of Rural Finance. Pp. 248-265 in: 
D.W.Adams, D.H. Graham & J.D. Von Pischke, Undermining Rural Development with Cheap 
Credit. Westview Press, Boulder 1984. 
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The poor themselves matter … and so do the non-poor. Their autonomy in self-
selection, instead of targeting, should be respected, also on separate vs. mixed 




















   Access to savings facilities, credit, insurances and money transfer services 
matters – far more than interest rates. 
   Rural enterprise viability matters and is mutually reinforcing the viability of rural 
financial institutions.  
   Household portfolio diversification matters; however small scale farms have to get 
specialized in order to grow. 
 
What matters in terms of origin, history and culture: 
   Informal finance matters, particularly in the form of self-help groups (SHGs). 
Upgrading and mainstreaming through networking and linking them to banks are 
two ways in which donors can support expansion of outreach and financial 
deepening.  
   History matters. MFIs in Europe, since 1720, have started from informal 
beginnings and evolved, through appropriate regulation and supervision, to co-
operative banks and savings banks. Financial system development takes time. 
   Crisis matters. Financial innovations typically emerge in response to crisis. 
Inflation can erode a savings culture. 
   Development matters: Microfinance is no panacea; it requires a climate of broader 
development in order to be fully effective 
   Culture matters. Development from above, through the established authorities, is 
more effective in hierarchical or closed societies; development from below, through 
participatory processes, is more effective in segmentary or open societies.  
 
What matters at the level of financial systems: 
Financial systems matter. Donors can contribute to that evolution, but only in a 
long-range perspective and in a donor-coordinated and goal-oriented manner.  
Financial sector policy matters, particularly interest rate deregulation.  
The legal framework matters. Appropriate legal forms allow people to establish 
their own financial institutions in private, cooperative or community ownership. 
Savings matter, as a service to the poor and as a source of loanable funds.  
Financial intermediation matters: savings-first for low-yielding activities; and credit-
first for high-yielding activities - depending on the rate of return. 
Interest rates on loans matter, covering all costs of financial institutions 
Institutions matter (projects or credit funds don’t), providing continuity and 
efficiency. 
Competition matters, entailing institutional diversity and pressures to perform.  
Prudential regulation and supervision matter, to enlarge banking services, to 
protect savers and to enforce standards in supervised institutions. 
Knowledge matters. Effective knowledge management is urgently needed. 
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2.4.  Agricultural finance: how to manage its risks 
Is agricultural finance really risky and unprofitable? 
A good number of agricultural and rural banks, cooperatives and other MFIs have learned 
to manage their risks by: 
 







analysing the investment and repayment capacity of the entire household,  
providing a range of appropriate financial services,  
starting small and granting repeat loans of increasing size,  
providing incentives to both staff and borrowers to enforce timely repayment,  
combining group and individual technologies and offering opportunities to group 
members for graduation to larger loans, and 
expanding into remote areas through linkages with self-help groups. 
 
 
There is no doubt that agricultural finance faces high levels of risk: climatic, economic, 
technical and political. These risks may be covariant, affecting many borrowers in a given 
area. For reasons of risk management, farmers may prefer traditional agricultural varieties 
and practices which are less profitable but also less hazardous. These may be 
supplemented by modern cash crops which promise higher profits but are also riskier. 
Furthermore, the budgets of farmers and microentrepreneurs are integrated into their 
household economies, and expenditures for agricultural and non-agricultural, consumption 
and social purposes may be closely linked. In a number of cases, the belief of bank CEOs 
and donors in unsurmountable problems of rural and commodity finance has turned into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, either by categorically excluding this type of finance, or, when 
giving it a try, failing because loan officers are not experienced and not convinced.  
 
If one moves up the scale from micro to meso finance, the situation changes. There is a 
trade-off between diversification and specialisation. Access to global markets requires 
producers to specialise, adopting high-yielding varieties and benefiting from economies of 
scale. They may have to adopt risk pooling mechanisms (e.g., insurance, price 
stabilisation funds, futures) instead of diversifying into a range of small scale activities. 
Non-financial institutions and governments may have an important role to play in this kind 
of risk management to facilitate investments in the commodity sub-sectors and to 
stimulate the flow of finance from the private sector. 
 
Experience from around the developing world shows that virtually any type of financial 
institution, including commercial banks staying away from agriculture, can fail in the face 
of bad policy or bad management. On the other hand, experience also shows that any 
type of rural financial institution, once reformed and well-managed, can provide finance in 
a profitable and sustainable way for a variety of activities including those along the 
commodity chain – some with a stronger emphasis on commodity production, others on 
processing and trade. Among these institutions are:  
 









                                                
AgDBs like BNDA in Mali and CNCA in Burkina Faso (both with monopsonistic 
relations to organised commodity sectors), BNA in Tunisia, BK in Iran, BRI in 
Indonesia, BAAC in Thailand 
Rural and community banks, e.g., in Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, the Philippines and 
Indonesia  
Commercial banks like Centenary RDB in Uganda, EBS in Kenya, Banco Caja 
Social in Colombia, Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia, Micro Enterprise Bank (MEB) 
in Bosnia  
Financial cooperatives like SACCOs in Kenya and Tanzania, credit unions in 
Madagascar, People’s Credit Funds in Vietnam, savings and credit cooperatives in 
the Philippines 
NGOs like CHF/JACP in Jordan, UMU in Uganda, EKI in Bosnia, ASA in 
Bangladesh 
Credit-NGOs establishing banks like K-Rep in Kenya, CARD and others in the 
Philippines, Bina Swadaya, Purba Danarta and others in Indonesia, and, soon, in 
Uganda 
Member-owned village funds like Sanadiq in Syria and self help groups (SHG) 
linked to banks in India and Indonesia. 
 
Finance as a commercial proposition 
For these institutions and their customers, rural and agricultural finance has turned into a 
commercial proposition. Their experience has demonstrated that the social and economic 
objectives of rural and agricultural development are best achieved not by charity, but by 
financial relations between institutions and their customers based on commercial 
principles. Such institutions may profitably include commodity finance: not as their sole 
objective, but as part of a commercially balanced portfolio. The frontier of finance lies in a 
progressively extended balance between purely commercial and developmental 
objectives. It is hoped that, as financial institutions contribute to the growth and profitability 
of farm, off-farm and non-farm enterprises of various sizes, their overall lending volume to 
that sub-sector increases in size and profitability; and what may appear as social banking 
at the onset turns into commercial banking.  
 
Risk management strategies  
The issue is thus not whether rural and agricultural finance face particular problems, but 
that these problems are surmountable and have in fact been solved by a number of 
institutions. These institutions have developed a range of risk management strategies for 
the financing of agricultural and other rural investments. An abbreviated list of risk 
management strategies, which should be of particular interest to rural and agricultural 




5 See also Frank Höllinger (2004) and Giehler (1999) 
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Managing credit risks: 
 
Moral hazard of clients:  Rigid loan examination, monitoring and enforcement; graduating from 
small group loans to larger individual loans based on track record; pilot-
testing of new products 
Investment failures:  Spreading the risk through household diversification  
Co-variance of risks:  Portfolio diversification  
Weather-related risks:  Expansion of outreach to wider area and different crops; index-based 
agricultural credit insurance 




Providing opportunities for savings accumulation  




Establishing total track record including savings behaviour; microcredit 
technology if possible; 
Credit overdue:  Customer incentives for timely repayment; instant recovery action; 
cooperation with local authorities to enforce repayment 
Lack of collateral:  Warehouse receipts; non-formal collateral; joint liability; peer pressure 
 
 
Managing transaction costs: 
 
Remote clients:  Linking with SHGs; outgrower schemes; mobile banking 
High operational costs:  Wholesaling; economies of scope through savings, credit and 
insurance; computerisation; credit scoring; effective cost management 
Institutional efficiency:  Rationalizing products and procedures  
 
 
Managing asset-liability risks: 
 
Inadequate equity:  Equity participation by customers; new international social investors 
Inadequate funds:  Mobilizing deposits by transformation into supervised and lisensed 
financial institution; refinancing on national capital markets  
Interest rate risks:  Matching fixed vs. variable interest rates of assets and liabilities 
Political interference in 
interest rate setting: 
Enhancing networks and associations of financial institutions for 
lobbying; collaboration with donor agencies 
Liquidity risks:   Liquidity exchange; foreign currency loans 
Lack of term finance:  Increasing equity and quasi-equity; promoting term savings; new 
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3.  Supply- and demand-side issues: 
lack vs. abundance of resources and investment opportunities 
3.1.  Lack of finance in most cases… 
There are stark contrasts in the problem situation concerning the availability of agricultural 
finance between different areas and institutions. There are two basic problems here: one 
is the lack, the other one the abundance of financial resources, both resulting, 
paradoxically, in a lack of resources for agricultural investments. In many areas, there is a 
lack of loanable funds, or an absence of financial institutions willing or able to lend for 
agriculture. Most AgDBs and credit NGOs are not authorized to collect savings from the 
general public; others have an inadequate branch and agency network, like the ACB in 
Syria; or they refuse to accept savings because they are afraid of losing them, like ACC in 
Jordan. As FAO & GTZ (1998) stated, just at a time of expanding market conditions for 
agriculture, “the number of donor-supported agricultural credit programmes is in decline 
and there is little evidence, in many countries, that governments or commercial financial 
intermediaries are compensating for the reduction in supply of loanable funds to 
agricultural production, processing, and marketing.” Agricultural input finance has been 
declining since the early 1990s as a result of liberalisation and the dismantling of 
commodity boards. This has led to a reduction in agricultural production and yields, 
deterioration in quality, reduced investments, a decline in income of small producers, and 
an aggravation of poverty. In many cases, rural financial institutions give preference to 
financing those commodities which allow for deduction at source within a single-channel 
marketing system; among them are BNDA in Mali, CNCA in Burkina Faso, FECECAM in 
Bénin and the SACCOs in Kenya. Once the single-buyer privilege (monopsony) is 
abolished, seasonal finance dries up. There is anecdotal evidence of a tendency for 
farmers to finance (low-yielding) agricultural investments from savings and use expensive 
credit for high-yielding non-farm investments, including agricultural processing. 
3.2.  … vs. abundance of finance in some cases 
In contrast, in a number of other cases, there is an abundance of loanable funds due to 
successful savings mobilization. In many rural institutions offering financial products 
without a credit bias, the ratio between borrowers and savers is between 1:6 and 1:10; 
and deposits exceed loans outstanding. This excess liquidity, though generated in rural 
areas, is thus not available for agricultural finance and other purposes; instead, it is 
siphoned off to urban areas. Two striking case studies are presented in chapter 6.3: the 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Microbanking Division and Centenary Rural Development Bank in 
Uganda. Another example are the Chinese Postal Banks mobilizing around 10% of all 
Chinese deposits but are not allowed to provide loans. 
 
Abundance of opportunities for agricultural investments in some cases… 
Similar to the stark contrasts between different areas and institutions concerning the 
availability of finance, there are contrasting abilities of rural people to find profitable 
investments. In many areas, there is an abundance of investment opportunities  and 
entrepreneurship relative to the available finance. Of course, this is akin to saying: there is 
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a lack of finance for the existing demand, be it ample or limited. Thus, most institutions 
entering, or willing to expand, rural and agricultural finance will find a considerable amount 
of unsatisfied actual and potential demand, particularly for micro and small investments, 
many along the commodity chain. The challenge is to enhance products and procedures 
to expand outreach beyond top-level clients. Spreading the existing experience is thus the 
most promising strategy for rapidly expanding outreach to large numbers of the poor and 
other segments of the rural economy. 
 
…vs. dearth of investment opportunities: a new challenge 
Given the growth of savings, profits and other loanable funds in increasing numbers of 
rural microfinance institutions including some agricultural banks, there is a new tendency 
now for existing loanable funds to chase a limited number of rural entrepreneurs and 
investment opportunities. Thus, in a number of areas, there is a lack of investment 
opportunities and entrepreneurship relative to the available finance. Situations differ 
widely and pertain to all levels of investment size: from micro to small and medium. In 
some high opportunity areas, eg, in West and East Africa and in Indonesia, MFIs and rural 
banks, respectively, now start reporting “too much competition”, which would of course be 
diminished if new investment opportunities could be opened up. In other areas, as in the 
Philippines, rural banks and other MFIs engaged in poverty lending on a commercial basis 
do very well with microloans for microinvestments, using the group lending technology. 
However, graduating clients to larger individual loans at lower interest rates has proven 
difficult. Rural banks have a strong interest deepening their outreach by helping clients 
across the poverty threshold with bigger loans, but are facing a lack of demand. Reasons 
may be variegated: profitable investment opportunities are not directly available; the rural 
poor are unable to take advantage of existing opportunities; or they are unwilling to face 
the substantially higher risks of bigger and longer-term loans; processing technologies are 
either lacking, or technological consulting services, agricultural extension services and 
business development services fail to reach down to the local level; financial products are 
not tuned to the cash flow of investors; markets are currently depressed, and investors 
disinclined to take on new risks. (Seibel 2004) 
 
There is thus an increasing need for developing new technologies, investment 
opportunities, market linkages, and local entrepreneurship. Over the past decade, rural 
and microfinance have focused on the supply-side, particularly the enhancement of 
sustainable financial services. There is some discussion about Finance-Plus, ie, financial 
plus non-financial services. But most financial institutions have been hesitant, despite 
tempting donor offers, to take on non-financial responsibilities, which may range from 
agricultural and technological advice to health and educational services. They would 
rather prefer to link up with other agencies supplying such services.  
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4.  Agricultural development banks: ignore them, close them, 
or reform them? 
Historically, AgDBs were set up by their respective governments to promote rural 
development and alleviate poverty, though in actual fact, in a number of countries, they 
have tended to burn scarce public funds best described by the so-called “subsidy 
dependence index”. Donors provided funding and technical assistance (Giehler, 1999, pp 
11-15). Embedded into a political economy of administrative planning, AgDBs have 
channeled scarce government and donor resources into financial as well as income-
generating activities with the lowest rates of return – just the opposite of what financial 
intermediation, and development, should be about. For extended periods of time, neither 
their performance nor their impact were properly monitored. When donors finally did 
evaluate their support to AgDBs, many cut down or even stopped their assistance. In 
recent years, there has been a tendency to ignore AgDBs in programs of rural and 
microfinance systems development.  
 
On the negative side, AgDBs are weak or distressed in the majority of countries. They 
fail to mobilize voluntary savings and domestic capital market resources. Repayment rates 
are low; and transaction costs are high. Moreover, there has been a lack of supervision by 
regulatory agencies and donors. As a result, many AgDBs are unsustainable, and their 
outreach and growth are restricted. In most cases, their contribution to poverty reduction 
has been minimal. Many are technically bankrupt; and in Africa and Latin America a 
number of them have actually been closed. 
 
On the positive side, AgDBs have continued to be major providers of rural and 
microfinance services in most countries through their branch network. Their outreach 
varies widely; but in many countries, they are major providers of rural financial services, 
sometimes they are the only one. Data compiled in the AgriBank-Stat inventory, even 
though incomplete, give a total of 87 million savings accounts in 35 banks and 24 million 
borrowers in 50 banks, excluding the two giants, China and India. If we include the 
outreach of rural financial institutions in India
6 (3/2000) with 412 million deposit accounts 
and 72 million loan accounts, total saver outreach is 499 million and total borrower 
outreach 96 million. The importance of government-owned agricultural banks is not 
necessarily diminished by the development of a differentiated rural financial infrastructure; 
a telling example is the BRI Microbanking Division in Indonesia, with 29 million savings 
accounts and 3 million borrowers, which exceeds the outreach of some 54,000 formal and 
semiformal financial institutions and outlets.
7 
 
Where AgDBs have been closed, their market share has usually not been taken over by 
other institutions. There are now some examples of successful AgDB reform. They 
indicate that reform may well be feasible and that their financial performance and outreach 
can be greatly increased. There are thus three approaches that have emerged in 
response to the failings of AgDBs: ignoring, closing and reforming AgDBs. 
                                                  
6 142,000 rural outlets: 50,000 banking outlets and 92,000 primary cooperatives. 
7 The BRI units (excluding the branch corporate business of BRI) and account for 62% of all 
savings accounts and 74% of all deposits; 8% of loan accounts and 39% of loans outstanding. 
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Ignoring AgDBs and excluding them from the development agenda is at present the 
most common donor strategy. A variant of this is the practice of some donors to continue 
providing credit lines to unviable AgDBs and ignoring that this contributes to the 
perpetuation of an untenable situation. In some regions, governments pour vast amounts 
of funds into their state-owned development banks through credit subsidies, 
reschedulings, debt forgiveness, interest rate exemptions and recapitalization – ignoring 
the deleterious effect this has on institutional sustainability, outreach to the rural 
population including the poor, and the growth of the rural economy. This has fostered a 
culture of worst practices in rural finance. 
 
Closing AgDBs is a strategy particularly widespread in Latin America and Africa. In many 
countries this has resulted in a situation where agricultural credit has all but dried up; local 
financial institutions, frequently barred by obstructive legislation, have been slow in 
moving into the void; and large segments of the rural population are left without any, or 
with very inadequate, financial services.  
 
Reforming AgDBs in continued state ownership is a favored strategy applied in several 
Asian countries. Privatization as a strategy is more in favor in Latin America, but 
increasingly also in Asia. A variant of this strategy is a combination of state ownership with 
autonomous commercial management, e.g., through a management contract with a 
private firm.  
 
In the interest of government finances and good use of scarce donor funds, our first 
proposal is: close them or reform them, but do not continue to ignore them. If there is no 
scope for reform, for whatever reason, than AgDBs should be closed and make room for 
other developments in rural finance.  
 
However, with the reform technologies available and the need for a diversity of competing 
institutions with financial services to smallholders, microentrepreneurs and the rural poor, 
we strongly advocate AgDB reform. AgDBs should be transformed into self-reliant, 
sustainable financial intermediaries: 
 




having their loans repaid and their costs covered from their operational income;  
producing sufficient retained earnings to offset the erosion of their resources from 
inflation and to finance their expansion; and  
♦  continually increasing their saver and borrower outreach and the quality of their 
services to all segments of the rural population including the poor. 
 
Depending on the political economy of a country, ownership may be private, cooperative, 
public or mixed. AgDB reform deserves priority in the fight against poverty. AgDBs and 
donors should therefore cooperate in generating the required political will. In the absence 
of the political will, donors should stop undermining rural finance by using AgDBs as credit 
channels. 
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5.  Agricultural banks in the AgriBank-Stat inventory 
5.1.  Description of data bank  
This chapter is based on an evaluation of AgriBank-Stat, an inventory initiated jointly by 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH. 75 banks are included, 
among them agricultural development banks, commercial banks, cooperative banks and 
apex banks
8. All institutions have at least 10% of their portfolio allocated in the agricultral 
sector. Agricultural Development Banks are defined as mainly (above 50% of the shares) 
government owned institutions. Commercial banks are defined as banks falling under the 
banking law and not under a special act, such as the development banks act or the 
agricultural reform act. Apex banks are second tier or wholesale financial institutions. For 
the purpose of this report, a SPSS-file containing around 20 variables has been compiled, 
listed in Table 2, which can be made available to users upon request. 
 
Table 2: Variables 
Missing values 
Variables N  Number Percent 
Country 75  0  0 
Continent 75  0  0 
Date of establishment  71  4  5.3 
Date of balance sheet  71  4  5.3 
Type of institution  71  4  5.3 
Type of legislation  64  11  14.7 
% governmental ownership  66  9  12.0 
Number of branches  65  10  13.3 
Number of staff  58  17  22.7 
First source of funds  65  10  13.3 
Second source of funds  43  32  42.7 
Third source of funds  20  55  73.3 
Number of loan accounts  50  25  33.3 
Number of savings deposit accounts  51  24  32.0 
S/L ratio (deposit accounts/loan accounts)  75  30  40.0 
Total assets (in US$ m)  64  11  14.7 
Total outstanding net loan balance (US$ m)  51  24  32.0 
Total outstanding gross loan balance (US$ m)  15  60  80.0 
% of loan portfolio allocated to agric. sector  61  14  18.7 
Number of association memberships  74  1  1.3 
 
There are two major deficiencies in the data set. One is the large number of missing 
values, e.g., in about one-third of the cases there is no information on the number of 
                                                  
8 The data bank is hosted at http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsm/banks/index.htm. 
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savings accounts and the number of loan accounts. The problem of missing values is 
particularly prevailing among banks from Latin America, where nine out of 19 banks have 
provided little more than their name and address. All 75 banks in the inventory are 
included in Table 2, Table 5 and Annex 1; however, only 66 banks have provided enough 
information to be included in the other tables. We also excluded one non-bank 
microfinance institution (MFI), which provided insufficient data, and nine apex banks, 
which do not fit into the framework of our analysis. This leaves a total of 57 commercial 
and development banks. The second deficiency lies in the dated nature of the information 
from some of the banks and the spread over a wide period of time. In twelve cases, the 
reporting date lies before 2000. 
5.2.  Basic data of banks 
Origin: In terms of origin, the banks are spread over two centuries. The oldest institution, 
the State Bank of India, dates back to 1806 while the latest was established in 1999. 
15.5% were established before 1950. There is a peak during the 1960s, when almost one-
quarter of 71 banks were established, presumably in response to hopes for rapid 
economic development during the post-independence period. It is notable that the 
enthusiasm for establishing agricultural banks does not seem to have suffered much after 
that peak period; during each of the last three decades, between 11 and 14 new banks 
were established (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Date of establishment 
Year Number  Percent  Cumulative  Percent 
1800 - 1899  4  5.6  5.6 
1900 - 1949  7  7.8  15.5 
1950 - 1959  6  8.5  23.9 
1960 - 1969  17  23.9  47.9 
1970 - 1979  11  15.5  63.4 
1980 - 1989  12  16.9  80.3 
1990 - 1999  14  19.7  100.0 
Total 71  100.0     
























Figure 1: Date of establishment 
 
Region: A majority of institutions (41%) are from Asia-Pacific, followed by Africa (32%) 
and Latin America (24%) – two continents that have suffered much from the closing of 
agricultural banks. As banks from Latin America were less prolific in providing data, they 
account for only 9% of the banks in the remaining sample of banks with sufficient data, 
while Asia-Pacific banks account for 49% and African banks for 40%. (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Number of institutions by continent 
Number Percent 
Continent  All  cases Filtered All  cases Filtered 
Africa 24  23  32.0  40.4 
Asia & Pacific  31  28  41.3  49.1 
Latin America  18  5  24.0  8.8 
others 2  1  2.7  1.8 
Total 75  57  100.0  100.1* 
* Error due to rounding 
 
Table 5 provides an overall survey of the banks listed by continent, country, and 
abbreviation of bank, in alphabetic order. All variables in the data set are included in the 
order in which they are listed in Table 2. The full names of the banks are given in Annex 1. 
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Table 5: Basic data of agricultural banks in FAO AgriBank Stat (amounts in million US$)
9 
20 
                                                  
9 Source: http://www.fao.org/ag/ags/agsm/banks/index.htm Agricultural banks in the AgriBank-Stat inventory 
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5.3.  Type and ownership 
Type of institution: Within the filtered data set, 68% of 57 institutions are reported as 
development banks, 32% as commercial banks. 
 
Table 6: Type of institution 
Type of institution  Number  Percent 
Development bank  39  68.4 
Commercial bank  18  31.6 
Total 57  100.0 
 
Government ownership: Bank status overlaps, but is not identical, with government 
ownership. Among 52 banks with sufficient information, 43 banks (83%) are mainly, and of 
these 38 fully, government-owned; seven banks are fully private. 89% of development 
banks and 37.5% of the commercial banks are fully government-owned; 44% of the 
commercial banks are private. There is a strong statistical correlation between type of 
institution and government ownership ( 000 . 0 ; 68 . 0 = − = α r ). 
 
Table 7: Governmental ownership by type of institution 
Type of institution 
Development bank  Commercial bank  Total 
Government 
ownership  Number  %  Number %   
Below 50%  0  0  9  56.25  9 
Above 50%  36  100.0  7  43.75  43 
Total 36 100.0  16  100.0  52 
 
Type of legislation: 31 (60%) out of 52 institutions report registration under banking law, 
21 institutions (40%) under special law. All but one commercial bank operate under 
banking law while development banks operate either under banking law (44%) or special 
law (56%). 
 
Table 8: Type of institution by type of legislation 
Type of institution 
Development bank  Commercial bank  Total 
Type of 
legislation  Number  %  Number %   
Banking law  15  41.7  16  100.0  31 
Special law  21  58.3  0  0  21 
Total 36 100.0  16  100.0  52 
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5.4. Size 
The banks vary widely by size, as indicated by the minimum and maximum values in 
Table 9. Three indicators of size are reported here: number of branches, number of staff 
and total assets. Given the weight of one extreme case, namely the Agricultural Bank of 
China, the median (with the same number of cases above and below) is the most useful 
statistical measure. 
 
Table 9: Indicators of size 
 Mean  Median Minimum Maximum
Number of branches 1,422 45  3  50,000 
Number of staff 19,003  1,200  75  500,000 
Total assets (in US$ m)  8,771  310  10  190,000 
 
Number of branches: More than half of the banks have less than 50 branches; the 
smallest has three branches. The Agricultural Bank of China, the biggest bank in terms of 
branches, has 50,000 branches, which is over 40,000 more than the State Bank of India, 
which is next in size. The median size is 45 branches. 
 
Table 10: Number of branches 
Number of branches  Number  Percent  Cumulative Percent
1 - 10  7  12.7  12.7 
11 - 25  9  16.4  29.1 
26 - 50  13  23.6  52.7 
51 - 100  3  5.4  58.2 
101 - 500  11  20.0  78.2 
501 - 1,000  4  7.3  85.5 
1,001 - 5,000  6  10.9  96.4 
More than 5,000
* 1  3.6  100.0 
Total 55  100.0 
Mean: 1,422   
Median: 45   
* Maximum = 50,000 
 
Number of staff members: 40% of the banks have less than 1000 staff members; the 
median size is 1,200. The smallest bank has a staff of 75; the biggest bank, the 
Agricultural Bank of China, has 500,000 staff members, or 10 per branch. The State Bank 
of India, which is next in size, has 215,000 staff members, or 113 per branch.  
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Table 11: Number of staff 
Number of staff  Number  Percent  Cumulative Percent
75 - 199  9  17.3  17.3 
200 - 499  4  7.7  25.0 
500 - 999  8  15.4  40.4 
1,000 - 4,999  16  30.8  71.2 
5,000 - 9,999  4  7.7  78.8 
Above 9,999
a 11  21.2  100.0 
Total 52  100.0 
Mean: 19,003   
Median: 1,200   
a maximum = 500,000 
 
Total assets: Total assets vary from a minimum of US$10 million to a maximum of 
$190,000 million. The median size in terms of total assets is $310 million. The three 
biggest banks in terms of total assets account for 81% of all assets recorded in this data 
bank. They are all from Asia; two are in China (together $273 billion in total assets); the 
other one is from India ($93 billion). 
 
Table 12: Total assets (in US$ million) 
Assets in US$ m  Number  Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
50 10  18.9  18.9 
100 8  15.1  34.0 
500 13  24.5  58.5 
2,500 8  15.1  73.6 
10,000 10  18.9  92.5 
above
a 4  7.5  100.0 
Total 53  100.0 
Mean: 8,771   
Median: 310   
a maximum = 190,000 
 
Explaining variance: Using factor analysis, size is the most important factor to explain 
variance within this data set, explaining 44% of the variance. The rotated
10 component 
matrix (Table 13) resulting from all variables in the data set indicates that the following 
variables load highly on a first factor, which we call size of institution: number of branches, 
number of staff, number of saving accounts, number of loan accounts, total assets and 
total outstanding net loan balance. 
 
                                                  
10 Only the rotated matrix is displayed since the non-rotated solutions may depend randomly on 
start conditions of the iteration. 
25 Agricultural banks in the AgriBank-Stat inventory 
 
There are two other factors, but of lesser importance. Factor 2, which we call development 
orientation, explains another 20% of variance. It comprises type of institution and 
percentage of loan portfolio allocated to agriculture (see figures in italics
11). Factor 3, type 
of legislation, explains an additional 15%. 
 
Table 13: Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
Factor  1 2 3 
Type of institution -.025  -.763  .285 
Type of legislation  -.159  .321  -.807 
% governmental ownership categorized .219  .693  -.387 
Number of branches .941  -.072  .157 
Number of staff  .912  .072  .210 
Number of saving accounts  .894 -.103 -.113 
Number of loan accounts .810  .065  -.062 
Total assets (in US$ m)  .840  .097  .402 
Total outstanding net loan balance (US$ m)  .679  .178  .581 
% of loan port. allocated to agric.  sector  -.117 .840 .231 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
5.5. Credit 
Number of loan accounts: Only 44 banks have indicated the number of loan accounts. 
They range from a minimum of 250 to a maximum of 5,000,000; the median is 21,000 
(Table 14). 
 
Table 14: Loan accounts 
Number of loan accounts Number  Percent Cumulative Percent
1 - 10,000  15  34.1  34.1 
10,001 - 50,000  12  27.3  61.4 
50,001 - 100,000  3  6.8  68.2 
100,001 - 500,000  5  11.4  79.5 
500,001 - 1,000,000  3  6.8  86.4 
1,000,001 - 5,000,000 6  13.6  100.0 
Total 44 100.0     
Mean: 546,564    
Median: 21,000    
                                                  
11 The minus at Type of institution’s loading on factor 2 is due to coding, with development bank 
coded 1 and commercial bank coded 2.According to the data, development banks are more 
likely than commercial banks to allocate their portfolio to agriculture. 
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Due to a highly skewed distribution (Figure 2), the mean, with 547,000 accounts, differs 
widely from the median of 21,000. 
 
 










Figure 2: Loan accounts 
 
Net loans outstanding: The distribution of net loans outstanding, reported by 45 banks, 
is similarly skewed, ranging from a minimum of $2 million to a maximum of $125 billion 
(Table 15). The median is $115 million, the mean $4,133 million. 
 
Table 15: Total loans outstanding net (US$ m) 
Loans outstanding (net) Number  Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
- 50  17  37.8  37.8 
- 100  5  11.1  48.9 
- 1,000  10  22.2  71.1 
- 10,000  11  24.4  95.6 
- 100,000  1  2.2  97.8 
above 1  2.2  100.0 
Total 45  100.0     
Mean: 4,132.7     
Median: 115.0     
 
As the extremes of the scale cannot be easily captured in a graph, three observations 
each at the low, middle and high end of the scale are presented in (Table 16). 
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Table 16: Selected net loans outstanding at the low, middle and high end of the distribution 
(US$ m) 
Category of net loans  Size of net loans outstanding 
3.5 
5.5  Smallest three  
8.0 
97.0 
115.0  Middle three  
128.0 
2,500.0 
35,000.0  Largest three  
125,000.0 
 
Number of loan accounts and net amounts of loans outstanding correlate highly with 
number of branches, as measured by Spearman’s rho
12. Coefficients are highest for 
number of branches with number of loan accounts (0.81) and net amount of loans 
outstanding (0.67) and somewhat lower for number of loan accounts with net amount 
outstanding. That means, number of branches and number of loan accounts increase 
simultaneously in our distribution; at the same time, average loan size falls somewhat; 
therefore there is a small correlation between branches and loans outstanding and an 
even small correlation between number of loan accounts and amount outstanding. 
 
Table 17: Bivariate correlations (Spearman’s rho ) between Number of branches, Number of 
loan accounts and Total loans outstanding (net) 
 
Spearman’ rho 
Number of loan 
accounts 
Total outstanding net 
loan balance (US$ m)
Number of branches  .813**  .669** 
Number of loan accounts    .434** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Agricultural lending: Fifty banks indicated the Percentage of loan portfolio allocated to 
agriculture. The lowest percentage given was 10%, the highest 100%. 26% of the banks 
lend up to 20% of their portfolio to agriculture, 34% more than 80%. There are 11 banks 
among the 50 that lend exclusively to agriculture. All 17 banks with a more than 80% 
agricultural portfolio are development banks. 
 
                                                  
12 This is more appropriate than Pearson’s r, which is more sensitive to extremes. 
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Table 18: Percentage of loan portion allocated to agricultural sector 
% 
allocated Number  Percent  Cumulative  Percent 
Up to 20  13  26.0  26.0 
21-40 6 12.0  38.0 
60 6 12.0  50.0 
80 8 16.0  66.0 
99 6 12.0  78.0 
100 11  22.0  100.0 
Total 50  100.0 
Mean: 58     
Median: 63     
5.6. Savings  deposits 
44 banks provided information on savings accounts; 31 banks out of the total number of 
75 gave no information. 11 of the remaining 44 banks, or 25%, stated they offer no 
savings deposit services; all of these 11 banks are development banks. The number of 
savings accounts ranges from zero to 27,000,000. The mean number of savings accounts 
of the 44 banks is 1,969,952, the median 35,000. 
 
Table 19: Number of saving accounts  
Number of savings accounts  Number  Valid Percent  Cumulative Percent 
0 11 25.0  25.0 
1 - 10,000  6  13.6  38.6 
10,001 - 50,000  7  15.9  54.5 
50,001 - 100,000  2  4.5  59.1 
100,001 - 500,000  5  11.4  70.5 
500,001 - 1,000,000  2  4.5  75.0 
1,000,001 - 5,000,000 6  13.6  88.6 
5,000,001 - 10 m  3  6.8  95.5 
above 10 m  2  4.5  100.0 
Total 44  100.0   
Mean: 1,969,952     
Median: 35,000     
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How the number of savings accounts varies conjointly with the number of branches and 
loan accounts is shown in the following 3-D surface plot. 
 
3D Surface Plot
Figure 3: A model for outreach? Savings accounts and Number of branches against Loan 
accounts (extremes excluded) 
5.7.  Membership in international associations 
Three banks did not join any of the international associations. The majority of 54 banks 
with valid data holds a single membership. The in the mid 70s established regional 
agricultural credit associations APRACA, NENARACA and AFRACA, in that order, are the 
most commonly joined associations. This underlines the importance of these associations 
for the political dialogue on AgDB reform. 
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Table 20: Membership in international associations 
Association  Number 
Asia Pacific Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (APRACA)  19 
Near East North Africa Regional Agricultural Credit Association (NENARACA)  14 
African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA)  10 
Association of Development Financial Institutions in Asia-Pacific (ADFIAP)  6 
Asociación Latinoamericana de Instituciones Financieras para el Desarrollo (ALIDE)  5 
Association of National Development Finance Institutions in Member Countries of the Islamic 
Development Bank (ADFIMI)  3 
Microfinance Network  3 
Banking With The Poor Network  2 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA)  3 
No membership  3 
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6.  Case studies of agricultural banks 
6.1.  Banks preparing for reform 
A regional perspective: Two banks in neighboring countries are presented below, both 
dating back to the Ottoman Bank of Myra, with its head office established in Damascus in 
1888. Myra means the share of the state as landowner in cereal revenues. The original 
function was that of a tax-in-kind collection agency rather than a financial intermediary. 
Both have come a long way to where they are now, ready for reform to a commercially 
operating rural bank with national outreach. Both banks have participated in the dialogue 
on agricultural bank reform organized by NENARACA among its member institutions and 
supported by IFAD. A continual policy dialogue among the member institutions of 
NENARACA and among the policy makers of the respective countries in North Africa and 
the Near East might play a crucial role in creating a general climate of agricultural bank 
reform in the region. 
6.1.1.  Agricultural Cooperative Bank (ACB), Syria: separating banking from 
trading 
Incipient liberalization of the policy environment: ACB operates within a macro-
economically stable, but tightly controlled system. Interest rates and agricultural prices are 
regulated; the exchange rate is fixed; banks are nationalized. The enactment of a private 
banking law in 26/9/2001, backed by a new monetary and banking law in March 2002, and 
the opening of the first private bank on 7 January 2004 are signs of the gradual opening of 
the economy. To expand growth and well-being to the rural areas where half the 
population lives, Syria needs an effective rural financial system with a full range of 
financial services to all segments of the rural population. The access of small producers, 
women and the poor to adequate deposit services and credit is restricted. 
 
Outreach: With 266,000 borrowers (20% of rural households, 7% of rural adults) and a 
portfolio of US$ 461m of loans outstanding in 1999, ACB, has an important role to play in 
the growth of rural finance. Its main outreach instrument are 6,820 cooperatives, which 
the bank uses as a channel for microcredit to 215,000 small farmers. 81% of all clients are 
reached through cooperatives. In terms of amount, direct lending to farmers accounts for 
60%. Among the bank’s assets are a network of 106 branches all over Syria; a staff of 
2,367, 91% of them in the branches; its focus on private farmers and cooperatives (rather 
than state-owned enterprises); its provision of both credit and deposit services; and its 
access to judicial process in case of defaulting.  
 
Products: Deposit products comprise current accounts at 4.0% interest p.a.; passbook 
savings at 8.0%; 6-month term deposits at 7.6% and 12-month term deposits at 8.0%. 
Total deposits in ACB amount to SP 8.6bn (US$ 187m) and account for 41% of loans 
outstanding. The bulk of deposits – 86% - is in current accounts: practically the only type 
of deposits of the public sector and the cooperatives. The public sector is a small borrower 
(0.6% of loans outstanding), but a big depositor (73% of all current account deposits and 
63% of all deposits). Cooperatives account for 21% of current account deposits and 18% 
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of total deposits. Private farmers mainly save in passbook savings accounts (withdrawable 
at any branch): 64%% of their deposits are in passbook savings, 8% in term deposits and 
28% in current accounts. The deposits of private farmers account for 19.5 % of all 
deposits. 
 
There are three major types of loans: Seasonal and short-term loans for periods less than 
360 days; medium-term loans for period up to 5 years; and long-term loans for 6-10 years. 
There are seven loan products, with interest rates varying from 4% to 7.5% p.a. Most 
loans, including all small loans, are at 4%; the highest interest rate is charged on larger-
size private loans. Total portfolio in 1999 was SP 21.2 bn (US$ 461m). In addition, ACB 
handles a portfolio of SP 668m on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture and other agencies.  
Other services are the bank’s major business, namely commerce in agricultural inputs, 
equipment and seeds. Warehouse stocks at the end of 1999 amounted to SP 1.0bn. 
Fertilizer trading is the single most-important item (69% of warehouse stocks), followed by 
chemicals and bags.  
 
Performance:  The bank faces a mission, which is impossible in its striving for good 
performance: transaction costs are high due to overstaffing at branch level; and it is 
compelled to pay the same interest rates on deposits as all other government banks while 
charging the lowest rates for its services. 
 
During the 70s and 80s, arrears as a percentage of the amount due declined from a high 
of 40% in 1970 to an all-time low of 2.4% in 1990, reflecting increasing insistence on 
repayment. This trend was reversed during the first part of the 1990s. Arrears increased 
from 2.4% to 6% between 1990 and 1994, lingered around 10% during 1995-96 and 
jumped to an all-time high of 44% in 1999. While the high in arrears ratios was attributed 
to drought, the reasons for the overall trend from 1970-90 and 1990-1999 have remained 
unexplained. There is no a write-off policy. Loans are either rescheduled; or carried on the 
balanced sheet as loans under settlement, namely 32% of loans outstanding. In 1974 and 
1999/2000, the government rescheduled all loans across the board. The cost of 
rescheduling were being borne by the government (not the Central Bank!). Rescheduling 
was combined with total exemption from interest payments and penalties. Interest already 
paid was deducted from the principal, to be settled against the Bank’s profits and 
provisions. Banking or charity – that is the question. 
 
Box 2: Fifteen trips to the bank for a loan 
In July 2001, Samirah applied to ACB for a loan of SP 50,000, repayable over 5 years. Only 
women are eligible to apply; but according to social etiquette, it is up to the husband to travel to 
the bank branch for loan negotiations. It took Samirah’s husband Barjas 15 visits to the bank 
branch, plus one visit by the wife to sign the papers. Travel expenses amounted to 16 x 200 = 
SP 3,200. Each visit took 9 hours. At a rural wage of SP 200, opportunity costs amounted to 
another 16 x 200 = SP 3,200. Interest payments during the first year are only SP 2,750; but total 
borrower transaction costs were SP 6,400 – payable up-front. Samirah and her husband Barjas 
expected disbursement a week after our visit; but if the loan officer of ACB happens to be sick 
that day, yet another trip might be due. 
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Credit is subsidized, and the interest rate structure inverted, ie, interest rates on savings 
deposits tend to exceed lending rates. This has been a disincentive for the bank to 
mobilize savings. Only 14% of deposits mobilized by ACB are passbook savings and term 
deposits, leaving a large savings potential untapped and depriving the rural population of 
an essential service; the balance are current accounts deposits, mainly by state 
enterprises. The inverted interest rate structure makes banking unprofitable and is a 
disincentive to lend savings mobilized. This is also the reason why transaction costs are 
shifted from the bank to the borrower, who incurs heavy non-interest expenses. In 
response to unprofitable banking, the bank has turned into a trading company. 85% of its 
gross income is derived from input trading and only 15% from banking. Its banking 
operations are loss-making at a reported margin of 9%; the Bank derives its profits from 
its trading operations at a margin of 3%. ACB’s banking operations are thus cross-
subsidized by its commercial operations.  
 
Challenges: Among the Bank’s weaknesses are its lack of autonomy resulting in 
governance problems and a lack of performance orientation in banking; the mixing up of 
profitable commercial operations with loss-making banking operations; an inverted interest 
structure which undermines both deposit-taking and lending; a lack of portfolio 
diversification and of attractive loan products for various market segments and loan 
purposes; absence of prudential norms under central bank supervision; limited outreach; a 
weakening credit moral due to recent loan rescheduling and interest exemptions across 
the board; and a lack of management information on portfolio quality. 
 
Reform agenda: Given its importance in rural finance and its potential outreach to vast 
numbers of small farmers and the rural poor, ACB should now be transformed into a 
financially sound and growing rural bank, which mobilizes its own resources, covers its 
costs, has its loans repaid, and finances its expansion from its profits; while its successful 
commercial wing should be separated as a subsidiary. Transforming ACB into a healthy 
bank requires: 
 










streamlining its organization structure, branch staffing, operational manuals and 
procedures 
rationalization of interest rates, replacing directed rates by market rates of interest 
on loans and deposits  
vigorous deposit mobilization as a source of funds and as a service to farmers and 
rural microentrepreneurs to strengthen their self-financing capacity 
demand-oriented financial products leading to a diversified portfolio 
timely repayment encouraged by incentives and the offer of repeat loans 
transforming branches into profit centers and offering performance incentives to 
staff 
increasing outreach substantially, especially to small farmers and male or female 
microentrepreneurs 
maintaining a high level of portfolio quality, with separate balance sheets for 
banking and commercial operations 
accounting and provisioning according to international standards 
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staff (re-) training in commercial rural banking operations. 
 
The crucial and as yet not fully resolved issue is the political will to transform ACB into a 
viable and sustainable rural bank. This requires a continual policy and reform dialogue 
between the bank and the policymakers of Syria.  
6.1.2.  Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC), Jordan: challenged by the market 
economy 
Banking in a liberal policy environment: Jordan has a growing economy with macro-
economic stability and a differentiated banking sector, which is highly liquid. To expand 
growth and well-being to the rural areas, Jordan also needs a differentiated rural financial 
system with a full range of financial services to all segments of the rural population, 
among them small producers, women and the poor in particular. Their access to credit 
and savings deposit facilities is restricted. Commercial banks and credit NGOs have 
moved into rural and microfinance, both with high performance standards.  
 
Outreach: ACC has 21 branches, which cover most of the country. Jordan is an urban 
country; only 20% of its population, or 153,000 households, live in rural areas; 50% of 
them own land. By end-2002, ACC had a total borrower outreach of 68,550 loans 
outstanding, which is close to market saturation rate with classical agricultural loans 
based on land as collateral. Savers do not exist. Over the last two years, around 4,200-
4,700 new loans were disbursed to clients: significantly less than the long-term average 
annual disbursement of 6,800 loans. ACC has difficulty attracting new creditworthy clients. 
Most ACC loans are granted to smallholders. In 2001, 88% of the number and 74% of the 
value of loans went to clients owning up to 3 hectares, and 89% of the number and 57% 
of the value of loans were below JD 5,000 (approx. $7,000
13). ACC loans outstanding are 
2.0% of the entire credit portfolio of the financial system. 
 
Products: Contrary to its original mandate, ACC does not accept deposits, which would 
be endangered by defaulting. ACC is thus a lending-only institution, with loans 
outstanding absorbing 93.5% of total liabilities. There are three major loan categories: 
interest-bearing loans to rural clients, which account for 96% of all loans outstanding 
(2000); loans on Islamic principles; and housing loans to ACC employees. Loan products 
are mainly differentiated by duration, comprising seasonal loans up to 11 months, short-
term loans for 1-2 years, medium-term loans for 2-10 years and long-term loans for 10-15 
years. The bulk of loans (JD 80m) is in the medium-term category. Seasonal loans have 
recently dropped from JD 20 million in 1999 to JD 3-4 million at the end of 2001 and 2002, 
while the total number of loans dropped from 8-10,000 in 1999 and 2000 to 4,166 in 2001 
and 4,519 in 2002. These figures include loans rescheduled once or several times. Major 
problems of financial products, which explain part of the decline as well as low client 
retention rates, include lack of savings products, lack of consumer and non-agricultural 
loans, excessive loan sizes and loan periods (in order to reduce transaction costs), and 
frequent rescheduling across the board. 
 
13 Exchange rate: JD1 = US$1.42; US$1 = JD0.71. 
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Box 3: Two clients of ACC 
Financing a successful horticultural entrepreneur: Tamam, a single woman, is a nurse in 
the Ministry of Health, where she works in shifts. She plants vegetables in several large plastic-
covered greenhouses, which she transports to the market in her own truck and sells to 
wholesale traders. She employs three workers. In 1995 she received a first mid-term loan of 
JD4,000 from the ACC Income Diversification Project to build the greenhouses. JD800 remain 
outstanding. In 1997 she took a seasonal loan of JD2,000 to plant vegetables. She has paid the 
interest; but as the loan fell under two government-directed reschedulings in 1998 and 2001, 
she has not repaid the principal. In May 2001, she took an Islamic loan of JD8,543 with a 
maturity of 8 years to buy a tractor and install an irrigation system. Monthly deductions from her 
salary of JD 180 are JD45 for the 1995 loan and JD116 for the 2001 loan. She lives on the 
income from her vegetable sales. She estimates the value of her investment at JD20,000. 
The man who keeps planting olive trees, which all dry up: Omar is 55 years old. He has 
seven children. In 1991 he received a first loan of JD4,500 with a maturity of 12-15 years for 
planting 300 olive trees and building a two-room house. The land is located on a dry plain, and 
the olive trees died. In June 1992, he received an 8-year loan of JD6,000 from an ACC goat 
smallholder project, which is now fully repaid. In the same year, he planted another 250 olive 
trees – from his own funds, he says. These also dried up. In 1999, at a time of drought, he 
replanted another 150 olive trees, again from his own resources. In May 2000 he received a 
third loan from ACC: JD1,500 to add two rooms to his house. Omar says that all the dairy he 
produces is consumed by his family; and that there is no other source of income other than his 
pension of JD 150, from which JD 90 are deducted every month. But why does he keep planting 
olive trees which all die? “Without an olive tree project, I have to return the loan at once,” he 
explained. 
 
Performance: ACC was established as a monopoly provider of low-cost agricultural credit 
at subsidized interest rates. Its health and outreach have been severely curtailed by a 
political culture of defaulting obscured by frequent interest exemptions and total portfolio 
restructuring. Repayment rates are low, varying from 66.7% in 1990 to 75.4% in 1999; 
during that period, overdues amounted to 45% of total assets, 51% of total loans and 
137% of total equity.
14 In 1999 all loans were rescheduled by decree, a frequent practice 
in Jordan, for a period of at least 4 years, affecting 40,762 borrowers, JD 60m in 
outstandings, and rescheduling periods of 3-10 years. Loan repayments thus started 
afresh in 2000. In 2002, the repayment rate was 70.5%. Interest rate exemptions were 
granted in 1985, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2000 and 2001, affecting a cumulative number 
of 266,864 borrowers and an amount of JD 32.1m borne by the government. The New 
Agricultural Policy Strategy 2003-2010 assessed the impact of these decisions as 
severely negative for the sustainability of ACC. 
 
Reform agenda: ACC has a limited market; and it serves that market poorly. Under 
conditions of increasing competition on rural financial markets in Jordan, the government 
therefore faces two alternatives: to close or reform ACC. Along these lines a decision had 
been taken in a Draft Declaration on Rural Finance of 1993: to transformed ACC into a 
sound and growing, profitable rural bank, which mobilizes its own resources, covers its 
costs, has its loans repaid, and finances its expansion from its profits. This, however, was 
not implemented. Meanwhile, a decision has recently been made at highest level to 
convert ACC into a bank and transform it along the lines of the declaration of 1993. 
Transformation requires: 
                                                  
14 According to an internal report, repayment rate of four branches in the Jordan valley averaged 
33% during 1987-94. 
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enforcing timely repayment rigidly and revoking all kinds of loan forgiveness, 


















cleaning up its portfolio: enforcing recovery of arrears; initiating judiciary process 
against defaulters; writing off bad debts (overdue longer than one year); having the 
government-shareholder replenish the capital 
adopting prudential norms enforced by internal control and central bank 
supervision 
adopting bank status under the banking law and central bank supervision 
diversifying ownership and governance by opening the bank and its board to 
private shareholders 
increasing its outreach to all segments of the rural population, including small 
producers, the landless, low-income groups, and women 
building up wholesale in addition to retail lending and providing banking services to 
rural microfinance institutions (MFIs) and self-help groups (SHGs) [linkage 
banking] 
expanding its delivery structure with sub-branches 
decentralizing the organization, converting branches into profit-centers 
providing a full range of financial services, including deposit-taking, lending, money 
transfer and checking accounts (later also insurance, leasing) 
offering deposit services, thereby mobilizing its own resources and strengthening 
the self-financing capacity of small farmers, rural microenterprises and rural 
industries 
offering loan products ranging from short-term micro-loans to longer-term medium 
and big loans, expanding in particular its microlending to women and the poor 
diversifying its portfolio in response to rural diversification, providing loans for a 
variety of purposes according to demand 
rationalizing its procedures for efficient local services 
adjusting its interest rates to market levels, covering all costs, risks and subsidies 
and financing its expansion from profits 
introducing substantial performance incentives tied to real profits of organizational 
units (thereby capitalizing on the abolishment of civil service status in 1999) 
retraining its staff. 
 
Given the directives from above, the crucial issue is no longer the political will to transform 
ACC into a viable and sustainable rural bank, but to actually implement this decision and 
free the bank from political interference. 
6.2.  Banks undergoing reform 
6.2.1.  Bank Keshavarzy, Iran: towards sustainable Islamic banking 
History and reform: Bank Keshavarzy (BK) is a dynamic and innovative agricultural bank 
in government ownership, with a 74-year history. The first window for agricultural credit in 
Iran was opened in 1930 by the National Bank of Iran (Bank Melli). In 1933, the 
Agricultural and Industrial Bank was established as a credit fund which neither mobilized 
savings nor covered its costs. It underwent several changes in structure and name, until it 
37 Case studies of agricultural banks 
 
became the Agricultural Cooperative Bank of Iran (ACBI) in 1969, with the mandate to 
enhance the state of rural cooperatives and provide short-term credit to small farmers. 
This was paralleled by the establishment of the Agricultural Development Fund of Iran in 
1968 as a financial institution for the emerging commercial farming sector after land 
reform, converted into the Agricultural Development Bank of Iran (ADBI) in 1972. After the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979, the banking sector was nationalized, and numerous mergers 
took place, among them the merger of ACBI and ADBI. Thus originated the Agricultural 
Bank, or Bank Keshavarzi (BK), in 1979. A new phase started in 1992 when the Bank was 
transformed into a deposit bank with the mandate to mobilize its own resources and carry 
out profitable banking operations. This transformation has gained momentum, with self-
reliance through resource mobilization and profitable operations and expansion of 
outreach as top priorities. Among the highlights of the new phase were: expanding the 
number of branches from 480 to 1700; providing commercial banking services; 
rationalizing all procedures; retraining staff; computerizing the branches. A proposal for 
partial privatization and trading at the stock exchange has been submitted to parliament.  
 
Dual mandate: On principle, BK functions as a financial intermediary and universal bank, 
founded on the ideal of self-reliance. BK’s mission is twofold: acting as a development 
bank implementing the government’s objectives; and a pursuing the goals of commercial 
bank maximizing shareholder value. While these two objectives are not fully compatible, 
there is an emerging awareness that commercial banking with its higher profit margin is a 
prerequisite for the expansion of the bank’s business into agriculture, poverty alleviation, 
microenterprise development and the promotion of women’s income-generating activities. 
Its dynamics are driven by incentive payments through branches as profit centers; 
incentives include bonuses and extra salaries, through which staff can more than double 
their regular salary. 
 
Products: Within its rural-agricultural mandate, the bank offers an exceptionally broad 
array of more than 70 financial products to all segments of the population: mainly small-
holders, but also women, low-income groups and commercial farmers. Among them are 
19 types of deposit products and 11 types of credit products; BK is also the first Iranian 
bank to offer web-based services. Deposits are the Bank’s main source of funds, 
accounting for 42.5% of all funds. Domestic borrowings account for 38.2%. In 1999-2000, 
66% of loans disbursed went into agriculture including animal husbandry. The Bank 
divides its lending operations into two major areas, although they are not differentiated in 
the balance sheet: retail and wholesale loans through cooperatives. Because of excessive 
defaulting, cooperative lending has declined from 20% of loans disbursed in 1996-97 to 
8% in 1999-2000. In addition, BK acts as a handling bank for off-balance sheet 
government loans to small farmers; and to the private sector within the framework of 
government projects, in which BK also plays a supervisory role. Through these off-
balance sheet operations, BK almost doubles the volume of its lending operations.  
 
Outreach: BK’s potential is enormous, but is hampered by a combination of 
macroeconomic factors and government control over banking. BK has a strong orientation 
to deposit mobilization and self-reliance, portfolio diversification, and profit-making. With 
1,700 branches and close to 10m client accounts (in a population of 65m), its saver 
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outreach (7.7m) and borrower outreach (1.04m) is vast. In a macroeconomic situation of 
incipient liberalization, it is ready for the transition to sustainable universal banking in rural 
and urban areas, with a continued focus on agriculture. 
 
Financial performance: Loan collection is in the hands of 1500 collection units, one per 
branch. During 2000-01, 9.8% of the outstanding portfolio was in arrears (after 
rescheduling). Rescheduling, combined with interest exemptions at government expense, 
is decided by parliament in response to natural calamities which are not covered by the 
Relief Fund. During three out of the four preceding years, loans were rescheduled, 
affecting about 50% of the portfolio and 589,000 clients during 1999/2000. BK as a 
government bank is considered a lenient lender, and late repayment is a calculated act: At 
an interest rate of 16% and a penalty of 6%, total costs of funds to the defaulter are 22%, 
while the value of the funds on the money market is 40%-50%, depending on the risk of 
the investment. Over the past six years, BK operated, in nominal terms, at marginal profits 
and losses. The value of the bank’s equity has been substantially reduced through losses 
and inflation. In 1998-99, paid-up capital stood at RI 419.5bn, while losses amounted to RI 
307.4bn, reducing shareholder equity to a mere RI 112.9bn. In 1999-2000, losses 
amounted to RI 258.9bn. In 2000-01, losses were brought down to RI 2bn. At the same 
time, government recapitalized the bank, bringing the capital up to RI 755bn (US$ 93.7m). 
Capital now amounts to 3.1% of total assets, which is not adequate. To maintain its real 
value, capital would have to increase at least by the rate of inflation every year.  
 
Making savers and the bank poorer: A major inequity results from a contradiction 
between a high inflation rate and controlled profit rates (the Islamic equivalent to interest 
rates) on deposits and loans, resulting in negative real returns on deposits and in capital 
erosion. With real inflation rates around 40% in recent years, depositors lose 40% of the 
value of their funds every year. At profit rates between 0% (Qarz-Al-Hasanah) and 20%, 
depositors lose between 40% and 20%, respectively, of the value of their money every 
year. To the same extent, the state unintentionally gains what may be seen as a usurious 
inflation tax. Borrower-investors are charged 13%-25% by BK. They either gain unduly at 
the expense of the depositors and the bank; or they invest in low-return activities, thereby 
hampering personal income and economic growth. The results of this situation are 
contrary to the principles of Islamic banking and may be interpreted as unintended usury. 
Gains and losses are unduly and unequitably distributed between depositors, borrower-
investors and the state. The gains of the state from the inflation tax and of diligent 
borrower-investors from loans prized below the real costs of funds are at the expense of 
vast numbers of depositors and consumers, and of bank capital. This has hampered 
deposit mobilization and the overall volume of financial intermediation between depositors 
and borrowers; it has eroded the value of the capital of depositors and the bank; it has 
slowed down the growth of the Bank’s services; and it has restricted the Bank’s 
microfinance services since the cost cannot be covered from the income of financial 
operations. Ultimately, this has distorted rural financial markets and undermined 
development. Low-income groups have been particularly affected: either by the negative 
real returns on their savings; or by the lack of access to credit. 
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Two related strategies are suggested: (a) bringing down the inflation rate; and (b) 
adjusting the profit rate structure, setting rates on deposits above the inflation rate and 
equating them with cost of funds in the determination of lending rates. This would create a 
conducive environment in which BK would then vigorously mobilize its own resources, 
remunerate its depositors fairly and adequately, provide a full range of financial services 
to all segments of the population, have its loans repaid on time, increase the income and 
motivation of its staff through higher incentive payments, and finance its expansion from 
its profits while preserving the value of its capital. (Seibel 2002b) 
6.2.2.  Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC),  
Thailand: gradual reforms against obstacles of financial repression 
Reform history: BAAC was established in 1966 as a government owned agricultural 
development bank. The original mandate was to provide agricultural credit to farm 
households. During almost four decades, BAAC has gone through a process of 
transformation from a specialized agricultural lending institution to a diversified rural bank. 
There were four major phases of reform:  
 
1966-74, laying the foundation for individual lending to farmers through joint 










1975-87, expanding its lending operations through access to commercial bank and 
donor funds and consolidating its operations by substantially reducing loan 
channelling through cooperatives;  
1988-96, striving for viability and self-reliance, under conditions of controlled 
interest rates, through savings mobilization, improved loan recovery and increased 
staff productivity;  
since 1997, adjusting to prudential regulation by the Central Bank and diversifying 
into non-agricultural lending.  
 
The result of gradual reform has been the largest relative outreach by any Agricultural 
Development Bank: 88% of farm households in Thailand, combined with institutional 
viability. 
 
Elements of reform: BAAC’s perennial reform has been guided by two, sometimes 
conflicting, objectives: outreach to all farm households as its political mandate; and 
financial viability in the bank’s own interest. Important elements in the reform process 
have been:  
 
Government respect for the bank’s considerable, though not complete, operational 
autonomy. 
A corporate culture emphasizing cost-effectiveness, productivity and efficiency. 
Decentralization and expansion of branch network operating as profit centers. 
Individual lending through joint liability groups, as a financial technology attuned to 
Thai culture.  
Substantial improvements in portfolio quality, which created depositor confidence. 
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A radical shift in the financial resource base to rural savings mobilization. (Maurer 
& Seibel 2000) 
♦ 
 
Outreach: In 2001, BAAC had 1476 branches and other outlets in all of the country’s 76 
provinces and a staff of 12,960 (6,308 of them loan officers). In 1988, banking operations 
were downscaled from the provincial to the district level.  
 
BAAC has 5.2 million registered direct and indirect borrowers, which is 92% of all farm 
households in Thailand. Of these, 2.74m are active borrowers, all in rural areas (ie, 8.5% 
of the rural population, 46% of total farm households). Together they hold 4.41m loan 
accounts, with an average outstanding loan balance of $1,321, which is 62.5% of per 
capita income.  
 
BAAC has 9.57m savings accounts (ie, 29% of rural population, 34% market share), with 
an average deposit balance of $270 or 12.8% of per capita income.  
 
Products: There are five savings products, two of them for small savers. One of them, 
introduced in 1995 with a minimum opening deposit of $1.15, has a lottery component and 
has attracted 2.1 million depositors with an average balance of $87. From 1967 to 2001, 
deposits from the public have increased from 11% to 76% of liabilities, the deposit-to-loan 
ratio increased from 14% to 98%.  
 
BAAC offers two loan products: retail credit to individual farmers through joint liability 
groups, accounting for 94% of the portfolio; and wholesale credit to agricultural 
cooperatives and farmer associations (6% of the portfolio). Until 1993, BAAC was 
restricted to agricultural production loans. Since then, it is permitted to extend loans for 
farm-related activities such as agro-processing and marketing up to a maximum of 20% of 
its portfolio. In addition, BAAC offers three insurance products, transfer and payment 
services. The bank is making strong efforts to have this restriction lifted and lend to all 
segments of the rural population for all purposes.  
 
Performance:  Total assets as of 2001 were $7.8bn, net loans outstanding $5.6bn, 
savings deposits $6.0bn, equity 0.57bn. BAAC is struggling with an arrears ratio of 12.6% 
and a ratio of arrears older than one year of 9.4% (including borrowers under debt 
suspension). Productivity was 434 active borrowers per loan officer. A cap on interest 
rates – perhaps the bank’s most serious problem - has restricted the bank’s profitability 
and the growth of equity, which in some years has fallen below the inflation rate. The 
capital adequacy ratio is 7.3%. ROA was 0.2% in 2001, ROE 2.2%.  
 
An unfinished agenda: BAAC has demonstrated how gradual reform can be carried out 
in periods of financial repression, with directed credit, interest rate ceilings and mandated 
agricultural lending quotas. Under these restrictions, BAAC expanded its outreach, forced 
cost-efficiency upon its staff, and prepared the ground for deposit mobilization. The reform 
agenda is still unfinished:  
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With the emergence of private depositors as major stakeholders, ownership of 
BAAC stock might be diversified, with adequate representation of the new 





Lending rates need to be fully liberalized and re-aligned to reflect the true costs (ie, 
increased from 12% to 15-16% p.a.). 
BAAC needs a new, performance-related management information system (MIS) 
which also enables field-level managers to track the performance of both savings 
and loans of a particular client. 
Performance-related staff incentives need to be implemented 
 
A recent paper by BAAC concludes: 
 
“… the deep-rooted truth for BAAC’s financial situation has to be seen in the political 
restriction on its lending rates. A more realistic pricing for BAAC’s loan operations is an 
important restructuring issue for the future.” (Haberberger et al., 2003) 
6.3. Reformed  banks 
6.3.1.  Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Microbanking Division: an Asian flagship of 
reform 
Reform by deregulation: Until 1983, interest rates in Indonesia were regulated, the financial 
sector was dominated by state banks, century-old BRI was the main provider of agricultural 
credit, heavily subsidized. When oil prices dropped and GDP fell, the government offered 
the bank two options: close it or reform it. In 1983, interest rates were fully deregulated, 
and BRI was placed under new management, which decided to commercialise the 3,000-
plus rural outlets (unit desa, established at sub-district level) of hitherto subsidized credit 
into self-sustaining profit centres (Kuiper, 2004). 
 
Product development: With technical assistance from the Harvard Institute for 
International Development, the bank calculated microsavings and microcredit transaction 
costs and carefully crafted two new commercial products. One was a scheme of voluntary 
savings withdrawable at any time with a lottery component, SIMPEDES, which proved to 
be immensely attractive and at the same time served as an instrument of resource 
mobilization at village level. The other one was a non-targeted credit scheme, KUPEDES, 
open to all and for any purpose, the only credit product offered by the units. Its features 
included simple procedures, short maturities, regular monthly instalments mainly from 
non-agricultural income, flexible collateral requirements and collateral-free microloans, 
incentives for timely repayment, repeat loans contingent upon successful repayment of 
previous loans, and market rates of interest amounting to 2% flat per month (equal to an 
effective rate of 44% p.a., minus 11% for timely repayment = 33% p.a.) to cover all costs 
and risks. 
 
Reform continued – reorganization of BRI: The financial crisis of 1997/98 would have 
wiped out BRI had it not been for its microfinance operations. During the crisis year, 1998, 
when state banks went technically bankrupt, the units yielded consolidated profits of $94m 
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and produced excess liquidity of $1.43bn. In response, BRI was reorganized in 1998 into 
three divisions: a Corporate Banking Division for loans above Rp 3 billion ($300,000 at the 
Oct. 1988 exchange rate), a Retail Banking Division with 323 branches which offer 
savings deposit services, provide loans on commercial terms from Rp 25 million to Rp 3 
billion ($2,500-$300,000) and handle the remaining subsidized targeted credit programs; 
and a Microbanking Division, with 4,185 outlets (2,566 village units, 1,220 peri-urban 
units, and 379 village posts), with loans from $5 to $2,500 and unrestricted savings 
services.  
 
Outreach: From the inception of the reformed scheme in 2/1984 until 6/2003, a total of 
31.5m loans were made. As of 6/2003, it served 3.0m borrowers; loans outstanding 
amounted to Rp. 13.18tr (US$1.6bn; or $527 per borrower). The number of savings 
accounts had grown to 29.2m, amounting to Rs. 24.68tr ($3.0bn; or $102 per account). In 
2000, there were about 6,000 formal and 48,000 semiformal microfinance outlets in 
Indonesia, serving some 45 million depositors and 32 million borrowers; the BRI units 




Performance history: SIMPEDES, voluntary savings withdrawable at any time, with a 
lottery component, proved to be most attractive savings product, outperforming all others 
by a wide margin. By December 1989, BRI had broken even in terms of resource 
mobilization: fully mobilizing its loanable funds through village-level savings, and 
generating excess resources thereafter. BRI’s self-reliance in terms of fund mobilization, 
together with its profitability, has created the material base for its autonomy and freedom 
from political interference which has so severely afflicted other state banks. 
 
The BRI units reached their break-even point eighteen months after the inception of their 
reform, generating Rp 9.8bn ($8.7m) in profits. For the period 2/1984-6/2003, the long-
term loss ratio (total overdue ≥1 day, including amounts written off, divided by total which 
has fallen due during that period) was 1.62%; for the period 1-12/2002, the 12-month loss 
ratio was 1.55%. Since 1994, return on assets (ROA) has been consistently around 5%-
6%. ROA stood at 6.4% in 12/2002 and 5.4% in 6/2003. Profits at unit level amounted to 
$177m in 1996, $94m in 1998, $167m in 1999, $119m in 2000, $129m in 2001, $186m in 
2002 and $89m during the first half of 2003
16. After 20 years, there is still no sign of the 
often-quoted iron law in microfinance of an increase in defaults and a fall in profits over 
time. 
 
The BRI units have a highly efficient MIS, which provide instant information on a daily 
basis. The data are forwarded to the head office where they are compiled and published 
on a monthly basis. The table below summarizes some of these data and may serve as a 
model to other banks.  
                                                  
15  Outside the formal and semiformal sector are some 800,000 channeling groups and the 
ubiquitous arisan, a grassroots institution of most of the poor as well as the non-poor. Despite 
the extraordinarily high level of institutional differentiation, some 50% of rural households are 
reported to remain without access to formal and semiformal finance. 
16 Consolidated profits before tax reported by the bank as a whole were Rp1,545bn, or $187m, 
during the first half of 2003; ie, about half that amount was earned by the units. 
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Agricultural finance: Under the subsidized BIMAS program handled by the units until 
1983, an average of $101m was lent over a 14-year period, part of which flowed into non-
agricultural activities. Under BRI's nonsubsidized KUPEDES scheme, about 20% of loans 
are directly invested in agriculture, that was $384m (out of total disbursements of $1.92bn) 
in 1996; and $338 of loans outstanding (out of a total of $1.60bn) as of 6/2003.  
 
Strong microfinance units in a weak bank: BRI is generally renowned as the bank 
which revolutionized rural microfinance, correctly so. The microbanking division is indeed 
highly profitable, and its outreach is vast; but it is only one of three divisions, accounting 
for 34% of total assets, 31% of loans outstanding and 41% of deposits in 2001. However, 
the bank as a whole had accumulated losses in 1999, 2000 and 2001 of US$3.98bn, 
2.81bn and 2.51bn, respectively. The units have cross-subsidized the bank in two ways: 
through the continual transfer of profits from the units to the consolidated bank; and 
through the siphoning off of savings mobilized at village level to the branches. 
 
The challenge of success: how to recycle savings at village level: The units’ success 
in savings mobilization has created a new problem: recycling the savings within the village 
economy vs. siphoning them off. Since 1989, the units have produced excess liquidity, for 
the past ten years consistently above US$1bn per year. These levels have been highest 
during the crisis years 1998 and 1999, with $1.43bn and $1.56bn, respectively – at a time 
when donors rushed to Indonesia to provide fresh credit lines, thereby further raising the 
country’s mountain of external debts. The units are required to place their excess liquidity 
with the BRI branch system; net placements amounted to $1,60bn in 1999, $1.24bn in 
2000 and $1.23bn in 2001 (Hiemann 2003:83). With its individual lending technology and 
no outreach mechanism to villages beyond the subdistrict towns, BRI has not been able to 
recycle the savings mobilized locally, despite an unmet demand for credit (presumably by 
about 50 % of the rural population, among them the poor and the near-poor).  
 
Lessons learned: Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of the BRI 
Microbanking Division: 
 







With attractive savings and credit products, appropriate staff incentives, and an 
effective system of internal regulation and supervision, rural microfinance can be 
highly profitable. 
The poor and near-poor can save; and rural financial institutions can mobilize their 
savings cost-effectively. 
If financial services are offered without a credit bias, the demand for savings deposit 
services effectively exceeds the demand for credit by a wide margin. 
Incentives for timely repayment work. 
Outreach of a financial institution to vast numbers of low-income people is compatible 
with viability, self-reliance and financial self-sufficiency.  
Average transaction costs can be lowered, and both the profitability of a financial 
institution and the volume of loanable funds can be increased, by catering for both the 
poor and the non-poor with their demands for widely differing deposit and loan sizes. 
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Table 21. Performance data of BRI units, 1984-6/2003 
Year  Savings deposits  Loans outstanding   























1984 2,655 42.2  640,746 111.1 38% (0.06) 1,0% 5.4%  n.a.
1985 36,563 84.9  1,034,532 229.0 37% (0.13) 1,8% 2.1%  n.a.
1986 418,945 175.8  1,231,723 334,3 53% (0.10) 2,7% 4.5%  n.a.
1987 4,183,983 287.5  1,314,780 429,6 67% (0.09) 3,0% 5.8%  n.a.
1988 4,998,038 493.0  1,386,035 542,3 91% (0.03) 4,6% 7.4%  n.a.
1989 6,261,988 959.1  1,643,980 846,5 113% 0.06 2,3% 5.4%  n.a.
1990 7,262,509 1,694.8  1,893,138 1,381,8 123% 0.16 2,0% 4.1%  3.0%
1991 8,587,872 2,540.5  1,837,549 1,455,7 174% 0.54 4,9% 8.6%  2.7%
1992 9,953,294 3,399.1  1,831,732 1,648,5 206% 0.85 3,4% 9.1%  2.6%
1993 11,431,078 4,325.2  1,895,965 1,957,4 221% 1.13 2,2% 6.5%  3.3%
1994 13,066,854 5,231.9  2,053,919 2,458,1 213% 1.26 0,7% 4.5%  5.1%
1995 14,482,763 6,015.7  2,263,767 3,191,2 188% 1.24 1,1% 3.5%  6.5%
1996 16,147,260 7,091.7  2,488,135 4,076,2 174% 1.29 1,6% 3.7%  5.7%
1997 18,143,316 8,836.5  2,615,679 4,685,4 189% 1.14 2,2% 4.7%  4.7%
1998 21,698,594 16,146.0  2,457,652 4,696.8 344% 1.43 1,94% 5.7%  4.9%
1999 24,235,889 17,061.4  2,473,923 5,956.5 286% 1.56 1.72% 3.1%  6.1%
2000 25,823,228 19,114.8  2,715,609 7,827.3 244% 1.17 1.11% 2.5%  5.7%
2001 27,045,184 21,990.6  2,790,192 9,873.1 223% 1.17 0.53% 2.2%  5.8%
2002 28,262,073 23,480.4  3,056,103 12,010.8 195% 1.28 1.66% 1.6%  6.4%
6/2003 29,201,210 24,683.1 3,028,633 13,175.0 187% 1.39 1.83% 2.2%  5.4%
Source: Laporan Statistik BRI Unit, June 2003 
* Calculated by the author on the basis ofyear-end exchange rates. 
** Total payments overdue one day or more in % of total loans outstanding, excluding loans written off. 
 
Sharing experience: Within a six-year period,1984-89, the BRI unit system became a 
model case in Asia of the transformation of an unsustainable program of an ailing AgDB 
into a network of viable and self-sufficient financial intermediaries with ever-increasing 
outreach and financial resources, competing successfully with a wide array of other local 
financial institutions. There is no doubt in BRI, which went public in October 2003, what 
the answer should be to the question, Agricultural Development Banks: Close Them or 
Reform Them? 
17 It is this experience which BRI is prepared to share with others through 
an institutionalised exposure visit and training program.
18 
                                                  
17 This is an astonishing development, in which the microfinance units played a decisive role. With 
total equity at US$ -3.65bn, the bank was technically bankrupt in 1999. In 2000, a new 
management took over, and the government injected some US$ 3bn. The corporate market was 
all but abandoned, and the bank now focuses fully on the micro, retail and SME markets. This 
resulted in a turn-around of the bank, which was internationally rated as BBB in 2001 (a better 
risk than the country at C). This new policy has been so successful that Moody’s assigned a B3 
rating to BRI (9/2003); and the bank is now traded at the stock market. 
18 International Visitor Program SBU Micro Banking, BRI, Jakarta. Fax 62-21-2511644, 2513013; 
ivp@bri.co.id, ivpbri@cbn.net.id.  
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6.3.2.  Centenary Rural Development Bank (CRDB), Uganda: an African flagship 
of reform 
Reform history: Centenary RDB was established by the Catholic Church of Uganda in 
1983 as a trust fund, with the mandate of providing savings and credit services to 
economically disadvantaged people, particularly the rural poor. While it did well in savings 
mobilization, it performed poorly in lending. In 1990, the political will to reform the fund 
evolved in the board, with the objective of transforming the fund into a viable and 
sustainable institution with increasing outreach to the poor. With assistance from the 
German Savings Banks Foundation and a German consulting firm, IPC, the fund was 
reformed within a five-year period, starting with its transformation into a full-service 
commercial bank in 1993. The key elements of the reform package were an individual 
microlending strategy, a staff incentive scheme, and enforcement of timely repayment 
assisted by a computerized system of daily loan tracking. This has made the bank the 
African flagship of rural banking, combining sustainability with outreach to the rural poor 
and demonstrating the feasibility of agricultural lending. With its new approach, Centenary 
RDB was also able to turn a number of branches taken over from the defunct government-
owned Co-operative Bank into profitable operations. 
 
Individual microlending is guided by five principles: (i) lending only to businesses which 
have operated for at least six months and possess a deposit account; (ii) lending to 
individuals only, but analyzing the activities, cashflow and repayment capacity of the 
whole household; (iii) starting small ($58) and short-term (3-6 months) and graduating 
after three satisfactory repeat loans to so-called automatic loans at substantially lower 
interest rates; (iv) flexibility concerning collateral, combining fixed assets and personal 
guarantees, land without a title, livestock, household items and business equipment; and 
(v) computerized loan monitoring as a basis for follow-up, staff performance analysis and 
incentives, and provisioning. 
 
Incentives at branch, staff and customer level include (i) converting branches into profit 
centers; (ii) incentive payments up to 45% of one’s salary, based on individual staff 
performance rating for loan officers and branch managers on position-specific scales, tied 
more to repayment (75% of the score) than disbursement; (iii) rewarding good customers, 
graded on a 1-5 scale, with repeat loans of increasing size and maturity and, after the 
third loan, a reduction in the effective interest rate from 48% to 30%, dropping defaulters 
at the same time. Until 2001, the emphasis of the incentive scheme was on portfolio 
quality (ie, the elimination of defaults) rather than productivity: a reflection of past bad 
experience of the whole banking sector in Uganda. This created a quality-vs.-productivity 
dilemma, which was only resolved in 2002 with a more balanced incentive scheme.  
 
Daily loan tracking, combined with zero-tolerance of arrears, is the single most important 
element in its financial technology. It is applied at four levels: the customer, the loan 
officer, the branch, and the bank. It has the following operational elements: (i) daily 
tracking by each of at least five loan officers per branch, one acting as a head loan officer; 
at the end of each day, every loan officer knows which customers have missed a 
payment; (ii) MIS on-line, entering information on missed payments the day a payment 
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falls due into a data base; (iii) zero-tolerance action, reminding the delinquent the very 
next day orally, then in writing within a week while documenting the results of the 
investigation; after one month, the total amount falls due; and legal action is initiated; (iv) 
branch control through the branch manager, who receives the MIS data and checks the 
performance of each loan officer; (v) head office control, reporting every morning to the 
General Manager of the Credit Division at head office, who in turn reports to the Chief 
Executive; (vi) Instant communication through a direct telephone line of the Credit Division 
to the branches; (vii) substantial individual staff incentives, provided loans in arrears for 
one day or more do not exceed 5%; (viii) customer incentives through access to bigger 
repeat loans and lower interest rates, and penalization of defaulters by being dropped 
from the list of eligible borrowers; those who are late in repaying fall back on the rating 
scale.  
 
Supervision: The branches are audited thrice a year by internal auditors, twice by branch 
operations supervisors, twice by credit supervisors from head office and once by external 
auditors and central bank examiners. 
 
The results of the reform process are impressive, providing strong evidence that rural 
bank reform is feasible in Africa (Dec. 2002 data):  
The bank mobilizes its own resources ($ 48.7m) from 316,650 depositors (up 13% 








It lends to 31,500 borrowers (up 43%) with a volume of$ 23.05m loans outstanding 
(up 84%), 99% of them small and micro borrowers; 
It has its loans repaid, with portfolio-in-arrears ratios of 2.1-3.1% during 2000-02; 
It pilot-lends to 4,900 small holders and 323 commercial farmers , with lower-than-
average arrears; 
Total assets were $61.3m in 2002 (up 35%). 
It is highly profitable, with returns of 4% on assets and 27% on equity  
Since 1999, it fully finances its expansion from profits and deposits.  
 
Total assets grew from Ush 63.5bn ($37m) in Dec. 2000 to Ush 86.2bn ($50m) in 2001 
and Ush 116.5bn ($61.3m) in 2002; total equity grew 2000-01 from Ush 7.8 bn ($4.5m) to 
Ush12.2bn ($6.4m) – increases of 35% and 56%, respectively, after a doubling of these 
figures between 1998 and 2000, and to 16.6bn ($ 8.7m) in 2002 (doubling from 2000 to 
2002). 
 
Outreach: Total saver outreach was 237,000 accounts as of end-2000, 280,000 as of 
2001 and 316,650 as of 2002. 93% are passbook savers. Total borrower outreach was 
18,411 accounts as of Dec. 2000, 24,120 in 2001 and 31,493 in 2002. The borrower-to-
saver ratio was 1:12.9 in 2000 and 2001 and improved to 1:10.0 in 2002. 
Products: By far the biggest demand, particularly by the poor, is for savings deposits to 
which the bank has vigorously responded. The bank offers (i) passbook savings as its 
most popular product generating two-thirds of total deposits (minimum deposits $5, up to 
23 free withdrawals p.m., 2% interest p.a.); (ii) fixed deposits of 3 and 6 months (up to5% 
interest p.a. ); and (iii) current accounts with checking services. Total deposits increased 
by 27%, 34% and 22%, respectively, since 1999 and amounted to $48.8m in 2002. 
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There are seven credit products: (i) business loans up to one year, the Bank’s most 
popular credit product (effective annual interest rate: 48%, lowered to 30% after three 
satisfactory loans;
19 (ii) investment loans up to two years; (iii) agricultural loans to 
smallholders with less than 2 ha of land; (iv) agricultural loans to commercial farmers; and, 
since 2002: (v) home improvement loans of $52-5,200, averaging $1,600; (vi) salary loans 
of $52-13,000, averaging $2,000; and (vii) small-and-medium-enterprise (SME) loans of a 
minimum size of $7,900.  
 
Loans outstanding increased since 2000 annually by 14%, 31% and 84%, respectively, 
over the preceding year, reaching $23.05m in 2002. Thus, the deposits collected by 
Centenary are only partially intermediated and transformed into loans – at a lending ratio 
of 35% in 2001 and 47% in 2002: still low
20 but higher than that of most other commercial 
banks in Uganda. The introduction of an SME loan product in 2002 has enabled the bank 
in a generally difficult year to keep up its profitability. Far from creating a sustainability-vs.-
outreach dilemma, it has enabled the bank to continue growing, at an unprecedented rate 
of 44% of borrower outreach, with 99% of these borrowers in the micro bracket and no 
mission drift. 
 
Box 4: Starting small, growing big with hard work, savings and credit 
Financing start-ups from farming profits, their expansion through credit: Nandina is 35, married, and has 
four children. In 1983, she started with a small rice farm. To protect her savings from inflation, she put up a 
building for a mill in 1992, continued saving and installed a mill in 1996 – all self-financed from the 
proceeds of her farm. Since 1999, she received four loans from Centenary. She acquired a second mill, 
expanded her produce trading operations, and bought two minibuses. During 2½-years, the value of her 
business grew from $3,500 to $8,000. She has two employees in her business and several contract 
laborers on her farm. 
A business empire built on hard work, savings and credit: C. Watuwa is around 50, married and has six 
children. Born in a village, she moved to Mbale where business opportunities are better. In 1971, she 
opened a small restaurant with her husband. From the income, she saved money in a bank and opened a 
hardware store of her own in 1975. In 1986 she got a loan from the now defunct Cooperative Bank for a 
lock-up store and, in 1991, a loan from the Uganda Women’s Finance Trust for produce trading. When 
Centenary opened a branch in Mbale in 1998, she became one of its first depositors. “Centenary is a 
greener pasture, it gives you no headaches”, she says. Within two years, she received three loans: around 
$1,000, $2,000 and $5,300. As all her payments were on time, she then graduated to an automatic loan of 
$8,670 at a substantially reduced interest rate. She invested the loans in a second lock-up store, a 
mattress store, and an extension to the restaurant. The total net worth of her business is now $133,000. 
Her secret of success is hard work and credit: “I worked when I was pregnant up to my 9
th month. I can 
work. All I need to expand is bigger loans.” 
 
Agricultural lending: In mid-1998, Centenary pilot-tested agricultural lending. Within 
three years (June 2001), the number of agricultural loans outstanding in the Bank reached 
3,000: 13% of all active borrowers and 14.5% of the portfolio. The main pilot branch in 
Mbale reached its break-even point within 8 months and an operational sustainability rate 
of 157 % by mid-2001; its arrears ratio was a mere 1.51 %, with an even lower figure for 
its agricultural portfolio (1.20%). Its portfolio remained virtually unaffected by the bumper 
crop and the resulting precipitous drop in agricultural prices of early 2002. Major success 
factors lie in prudent staff selection and specialization on agricultural lending; holistic loan 
appraisal; and instant enforcement of repayment.  
                                                  
19 This compares favorably to commercial bank prime rates of 25-26% in 2000. 
20 Reasons are a banking crisis and excessively high TB rates in the latter 90s. 
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Future challenges: The results of the reform of Centenary RDB are proof that rural bank 
reform is feasible in Africa. Given its successful financial technology and the virtually 
unlimited size of the rural market, untapped in many areas, further expansion of outreach 
to rural and agricultural areas remains the Bank’s biggest task. In that respect, the Bank 
has taken a new initiative, adding mesofinance for small and medium entrepreneurs to 
microfinance for microentrepreneurs. Far from creating a sustainability vs. outreach-to-the 
poor dilemma, this new venture allows the bank to mobilize more savings, which are of 
particular importance to low-income people, and to transform them into productive assets. 
Convenient deposit services for small savings are normally not available in the proximity 
of low-income people, in rural areas, but are of utmost importance to self-financed 
business growth and borrowing capacity.  
 
In this vein, major challenges and opportunities for Centenary include the following: 
expanding into remoter areas through sub-branches and linkage banking; expanding 
opportunities for graduation to mesofinance; lending wholesale to NGOs, MFIs and 
associations of farmers and microentrepreneurs – provided donors do not undermine 
finance with cheap credit; offering tied savings-cum-credit products and cross-selling of 
financial products; providing exposure training to MFIs and banks in the region. 
6.3.3.  Banque Nationale Agricole (BNA), Tunisia: a North-African flagship of 
reform 
Reform history: Tunisia is a middle-income country with political and macroeconomic 
stability (inflation below 3%) and GDP growth rates at or above 5%. The financial sector is 
largely liberalized, with a tendency for development banks to be converted into deposit 
banks. BNA has gone through 40 years of transformation and reform, in four distinct 
phases:  
 
It started out in 1959 as an agricultural finance institution providing credit to priority 






In 1969 it entered into a second phase as a national universal bank with a 
diversified portfolio to all sector.  
The third phase began in 1980 with its listing on the stock exchange and an 
emphasis on commercial lending from mainly domestic resources.  
This evolutionary process was interrupted in the early 80s by a wave of donor-
financed development banking interventions, an experiment which soon collapsed.  
1989 then marked the beginning of the last and still ongoing phase: the 
consolidation of BNA as a universal bank characterized by operational autonomy, 
self-reliance through deposit mobilization and commercial domestic borrowings, 
portfolio diversification, and profitability.  
 
Ownership and governance: BNA is a partially privatized bank listed at the Tunisian 
stock exchange. Government agencies hold the majority of shares; 34% are held 
privately. Like all public banks, it is under the authority of the Ministry of Finance and 
supervised by the Central Bank. Its Board of Directors comprises four government 
agencies, three parastatals and a bank. It is chaired by the president and director-general 
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of BNA. Despite a predominance of government representatives, BNA is a bank with full 
operational autonomy. 
 
Outreach: As one of 14 deposit banks, BNA is a universal bank of national outreach 
through 16 regional offices and 145 branches, the largest branch network of any bank in 
Tunisia. Total staff in 2000 was 3,138: 1,457 in the head office and 1,681 in the branches 
and regional offices.  
 
BNA has 700,000 clients, who are all depositors, 58% in urban and 42% in rural areas. 
250,000 of them are also borrowers. 
 
Products: Deposits from clients as of Dec. 2000 amounted to $1.23bn, total deposits to 
$1.42bn. Of 963,611 deposit accounts by approximately 700,000 clients in 2000, about 
half were checking and current accounts and one-third passbook savings accounts. There 
were 70,000 tied savings and loan accounts, which are one of BNA’s most innovative and 
attractive products. Interest rates are 4% on passbooks savings and 5-6% on term 
deposits, all with positive real returns (at an inflation rate of 2.7%). The average cost of 
funds mobilized from clients is 3%. 
 
BNA has abandoned subsidized credit as ineffective and inefficient. There is a cap on 
interest rates as defined by the usury law; but with interest rates on loans of 6,5-10% 
(equivalent to real rates of 3.8-7.3%), it remains well below that ceiling. BNA provides a 
full range of banking services, including deposit-taking, lending, money transfer, foreign 
transactions, and stock market intermediation. Its services include ATMs. BNA also 
invests directly in commercial papers and companies. BNA’s portfolio of loans outstanding 
to clients (excluding inter-bank loans) was TD 2,245.4m ($1.65bn)
21 in 2000; this is 77.5% 
of total assets. BNA’s main lending instrument is the current account, totaling 180,000. 
BNA has a special tied savings and loan instrument, totaling 70,000 accounts. Clients 
save for a stipulated period of time until they become eligible for a loan. Most attractive is 
the educational savings and loans product with almost 44,000 accounts; second in the 
favor of clients are consumer savings and loan accounts, numbering almost 25,000.  
 
41% of its net portfolio are in agriculture, 59% in non-agricultural activities. Agricultural 
loans are capped by law at 11.67% . Of the loans to the agricultural sector, 64.2% are in 
production and 35.8% in commerce. There are two major types of agricultural loans: 
seasonal loans up to one year, particularly for grain and vegetable farming, fruit trees and 
fisheries; and investment loans for the financing of machinery, livestock, land and 
infrastructure. The later comprise medium-term loans for 2-7 years with a one-year grace 
period and long-term loans for 8-15 years with grace periods of up to 5 years. With 41% of 
its portfolio in agriculture, BNA has retained its agricultural mission. Its agricultural 
portfolio has declined in relative, but substantially increased in absolute terms.  
 
There is an obligatory crop insurance scheme, for which BNA pays a premium of 2% on 
all loans, which is charged to clients. 
                                                  
21 Exchange rate on 31/12/2000: $1 = DT 1.3683; DT1 = $0.733. 
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Performance: BNA’s paid-in capital is DT 100m; total equity including year’s retained 
earnings was DT 350m as of 2000. This corresponds to 16% of loans outstanding and 
12% of total assets. Total assets amounted to $2.12bn, total loans outstanding to 
$1.65bn, total deposits to $1.42; the deposit-to-loan ratio was 86%.  
 
At average cost of funds of 3.0% and average interest rates on loans of 6.5% (adjusted for 
defaulting), the bank’s margin is 3.5%. While collection rates still need to be improved, 
BNA has made a net profit of DT 23.4m ($17.15m) in 2000: evidently an efficiently 
operating bank given its narrow margin. Return on total (year-end) assets was 0.8%, 
return on equity 7.2%. BNA has demonstrated that, in a reformed bank, sustainability and 
outreach can go together, even under conditions of imposed interest rate ceilings.  
 
Sharing experience: Among the agricultural banks in North Africa and the Near East 
which are members in NENARACA, BNA belongs to a category of its own: a reformed 
bank which looks up to banks in the highly developed European countries as benchmark 
institutions, rather than to AgDBs in the region. Within that region’s community of banks, 
its most noble function would be to act as an adviser to decision makers and a provider of 
exposure training to institutions entering into the reform process. It may serve as a model 
case of a universal bank which has retained its rural-agricultural mandate and which has 
combined sustainability with outreach. If its exposure-training services are to be used 
systematically, they would have to be provided on a professional, cost-covering basis. The 
establishment of such a service could greatly benefit, during the start-up phase, from 
donor support, until it attains self-sufficiency. 
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7.  Reforming agricultural development banks 
7.1.  New initiatives by donors and agricultural bank associations 
How best to initiate reform is an issue to be discussed in a participatory manner, in two 
forums: the donor community and associations of AgDBs. In order to agree on a 
conceptual framework, division of labour and steps to be followed, some initiatives have 






                                                
Various German Government financed projects in Asia with APRACA member 
institions (BAAC, NABARD, People’s Bank of Sri Lanka, Agricultural 
Development Bank of Nepal) implemented by GTZ in order to support savings 
mobilization, linking self-help groups with AgDB and introducing microfinance 
technology 
A joint IFAD/FAO/World Bank initiative on the restructuring of AgDBs in 1999-
2000
22 
The establishment of a CGAP Working Group on AgDB Reform in June 1999, 
comprising members from AfDB (Abidjan); AsDB (Manila); GTZ and KfW 
(Germany); OECF (Japan); SDC and SODC (Switzerland); UNCDF/UNDP (New 
York); World Bank (Washington) 
Preliminary agreements with the regional agricultural credit associations as 
partner organizations of FAO, IFAD and GTZ: AFRACA (Nairobi), APRACA 
(Bangkok) and NENARACA (Amman) on workshops to initiate reform among 
member AgDBs; and presentations at their respective regional and subregional 
workshops during 2000 with the following agenda: 
-  Initiate a participatory process among AgDBs, RACAs and donor 
agencies 
-  Review AgDB reform experiences and needs 
-  Work out appropriate strategies of AgDB reform 
-  Examine the demand for consultancy services to AgDB member 
institutions 
-  Work out a coordinated approach to AgDB reform in a participatory way 
-  Identify AgDBs for pilot reform initiatives, starting with pre-feasibility 
studies 
-  Assist member AgDBs in accessing donor support for reform 
-  Support networking and exchange of experience on AgDB reform among 
member countries 
-  Disseminate the results through workshops and publications 
 
22 In an exchange of letters of 14 June 2000 and 19 July 2000, respectively, the presidents of IFAD 
and the World Bank agreed that “… it would be timely for the World Bank and IFAD to 
collaborate more closely to help interested member states to develop the potential of these 
poorly performing institutions” (IFAD); and that “we fully agree on the need to substantially 
enhance agricultural and rural development through either closure or revitalization of agricultural 
development banks”(World Bank). FAO has longstanding technical collaboration agreements 
with both the World Bank and IFAD and the proposed collaborative work with AgDB reform falls 
within these arrangements. Discussions with the regional development banks are under way. 
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A conference in April 2002 in Cyprus on “Restructuring of Agricultural 




A conference in January 2003 on public banks with a rural-agricultural mandate, 
held in Sri Lanka with support from GTZ in cooperation with APRACA. 
A conference in September 2004 on “Sustainability of Agricultural Banks” 
organized by AFRACA supported by GTZ and IFAD and hosted by the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe. 
 
These discussions have intended to prepare the ground for a number of projects in RACA 
member countries and for donor agreements on their support. It is expected that the 
generation of political will to reform AgDBs will require a multidonor approach, including 
prolonged and concerted negotiations by the IMF, the World Bank, IFAD, FAO, the 
regional development banks and other multilateral and bilateral donors including GTZ with 
the concerned governments. 
 
The three RACAs summarized their appeal for agricultural bank reform as follows: 
 
AFRACA: 
(i) The governments have to take a decision to reform their ailing AgDBs…(ii) 
Adequate reform strategies should be worked out…(iv) The new banks should be 
operationally autonomous… (x) The new bank should endeavour to attain financial 
sustainability through charging market interest rates, savings mobilization, retained 
earnings… (Communique of the Afraca workshop in Abuja, April 2000) 
 
APRACA: 
To maximize their outreach, AgDBs… must cover all their costs, mobilize their own 
resources, protect their funds and assets against erosion from inflation and non-
repayment of loans, and make a profit to finance their expansion…. The recent 
financial crisis in Asia has highlighted the need for closer scrutiny and regulation of 
financial organizations, including AgDBs and MFIs…. The challenge is to find a way 
for all parties involved to work together for the continuous delivery of sustainable 
financial services by helping improve their viability and outreach to the poor. 
(APRACA-NACF Regional Conference in Bangkok, November 2000) 
 
NENARACA: 
(i) Nenaraca should write to member banks, asking which banks may be interested 
in undertaking a pre-feasibility study of restructuring and reform. (ii) The banks may 
approach donors for assistance in carrying out the pre-feasibility studies. (iii) 
Nenaraca will actively participate, or initiate, donor coordination in all phases of 
support to AgDB reform. (Recommendations of the Nenaraca workshop in Tunis, 
June 2000) 
 
These appeals were followed by a number of studies of agricultural and public banks, 
supported mainly by IFAD and GTZ, some of which have been summarized in the 
previous chapter. 
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7.2.  A Planning Framework for Rural and Agricultural Development Bank 
reform 
In the deliberations on agricultural bank reform by the three RACAs, their member 
organizations and several donor agencies including FAO, IFAD and GTZ, the following 
objective was agreed upon:  
 
Rural, agricultural and agricultural development banks (AgDBs) are transformed into 
viable and sustainable providers of financial services to all segments of the rural 
population, including the poor. 
 
To reach this objective, the following key results are to be achieved:  
 











adequate reform strategies  
an effective planning process 
operational autonomy and freedom from political interference 
an appropriate legal and regulatory framework with prudential norms 
financial restructuring (preceded byconsolidation of the bad debts of state-
owned and other enterprises) 
organizational restructuring & staff retraining 
an effective delivery system, with branches as profit centres  
demand-driven financial products 
operational and financial sustainability 
effective internal control and external supervision 
 
To facilitate a participatory planning process among agricultural banks a planning 
framework has been prepared (IFAD 2000; Ijioma 2000; Mustafa 2000; Seibel 2000, 
2001). (Annex 2) 
 
AgDB reform exceeds the capacity of any single donors and will require partnerships 
between several financial and technical assistance agencies. Close cooperation of donors 
with agencies such as multilateral and bilateral donors, CGAP, the RACAs and other 
agencies is expected to contribute to the generation of the political will to reform. Some 
donors, like the World Bank, may concentrate on the reform of the relevant policy and 
legal environment; regional development banks may focus on the restructuring and 
recapitalization of the banks; bilateral donors, like USAID and GTZ, together with bank 
associations in their respective home countries, may concentrate on the 
professionalization of management; others, like IFAD and UNCDF together with bilaterals 
and perhaps international NGOs, may put a special focus on the reform of the 
banks’microfinance services, retail and wholesale, to smallholders, micro-entrepreneurs 
and the poor, including their self-help groups, informal financial institutions, business 
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Annex 1:   
Names and abbreviations of banks in the AgriBank-Stat inventory 
NAME  COUNTY, ABREVIATION 
Agribank of Namibia  Namibia, AN 
Agricultural Bank of China   China, ABC 
Agricultural Bank of Iran  Iran, AB/I 
Agricultural Bank of Libya   Libya, ABL 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan   Sudan, ABS 
Agricultural Bank of Turkey  Turkey, AB/T 
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe, ABZ 
Agricultural Coop Bank Syria   Syria, ACB 
Agricultural Credit Corporation Jordan   Jordan, ACC 
Agricultural Dev. Bank Ghana   Ghana, ADB/G 
Agricultural Dev. Bank Nepal (ADBN)  Nepal, ADB/N 
Agricultural Dev. Bank of China  China, ADB/C 
Agricultural Dev. Bank of Pakistan   Pakistan, ADB/P 
Agricultural Finance Corporation Kenya   Kenya, AFC 
Banco Agraio de Colombia   Colombia, BAC 
Banco Agrícola de la República Dominicana (BAGRICOLA) 
Dominican Republic, 
BAGRICOLA 
Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario Panama  Panama, BDA 
Banco de Fomento Agropecuario El Salvator  El Salvador, BFA 
Banco del Estado del Ecuador (BEDE)  Ecuador, BEDE 
Banco Desarrollo Rural Guatemala   Guatemala, BDR 
Banco Multisectorial de Inversiones (BMI) El Salvador  El Salvador, BMI 
Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Agrícola (BANADESA) Honduras  Honduras, BANADESA 
Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF) Equador  Ecuador, BNF 
Banco Nacional de Fomento (BNF) Paraguay   Paraguay, BNF 
Banco República Uruguay  Uruguay, BRU 
Bank BUKOPIN Indonesia   Indonesia, BUKOPIN 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) Thailand   Thailand, BAAC 
Bank Pertanian Malaysia  Malaysia, BP 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia - Unit Desa  Indonesia, BRI-Units 
Banque Agricole et Commerciale du Burkina  Burkina Faso, BAC 
Banque de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural Algeria  Algeria, BADR 
Banque Nationale Agricole Tunisia  Tunisia, BNA 
Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole Mali  Mali, BNDA 
Bhutan Development Finance Corporation   Bhutan, BDFC 
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA), Morocco  Morocco, CNCA 
Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal   Senegal, CNCA 
Centenary Rural Development Bank Ltd (CERUDEB), Uganda   Uganda, CERUDEB 
Cooperative & Agricultural Credit Bank, Yemen  Yemen, CACB 
Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd   Kenya, CBK 
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Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, Cyprus  Cyprus, CCB 
Corporación Financiera Nacional  Ecuador, CFN 
Corporatión Financiera de Desarollo S.A. (COFIDE), Peru  Peru, COFIDE 
Crédito Agrícola de Habilitación, Paraguay   Paraguay, CAH 
Development Bank of Ethiopia   Ethiopia, DBE 
Development Bank of Solomon Islands  Solomon Islands, DBSI 
Farmer's Commercial Bank, Sudan  Sudan, FCB 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Pakistan  Pakistan, FBC 
Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación... FIRA, Mexico   Mexico, FIRA 
Fiji Development Bank  Fiji, FDB 
Fondo de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Pesquero, Forestal y Afines (FONDAFA), 
Venezuela   Venezuela, FONDAFA 
Fondo Ganadero del Paraguay  Paraguay, FGP 
Islamic Cooperative Development Bank of Sudan  Sudan, ICDB 
Joint-Stock Commercial Pakhta - Bank of Uzbekistan   Uzbekistan, Pakhta Bank 
Kafo Jiginew, Mali   Mali, KJ 
Kenya - Rep Bank   Kenya, K-Rep 
Kyrgyz Agricultural Finance Corporation (KAFC)   Kyrgyztan, KAFC 
Land Bank of the Philippines   Philippines, LBP 
Land Bank South Africa   South Africa, LB 
Moldova-Agroindbank  Moldova, MAIB 
Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank  Myanmar, MADB 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), South Korea   South Korea, NACF 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), India  India, NABARD 
National Development Bank, Botswana  Botswana, NDB 
National Financiera Boliviana SAM (NAFIBO)   Bolivia, NAFIBO 
Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank Ltd  Nigeria, NACB 
Oman Development Bank (S.A.O.G.)   Oman, ODB 
Oriental Bank of Commerce, India   India, OBC 
People's Bank, Sri Lanka   Sri Lanka, PB/SR 
Philippine National Bank   Philippines, PNB 
Planters Development Bank, Philippines   Philippines, PDB 
Principal Bank for Development & Agricultural Credit, Egypt  Egypt, PBDAC 
State Bank of India India,  SBI 
Tonga Development Bank   Tonga, TDB 
Uganda Women Finance Trust Ltd.  Uganda, UWFT 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development   Vietnam, VBARD 
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Annex 2:   
Rural and agricultural development bank reform: a participatory 
planning framework  
Objective: 
Rural and agricultural development banks (AgBDs) are transformed into 




Key results and outputs:   
1.  The political will to reform the AgDB is activated: 
1.1  The political decision is taken by government to reform its AgDB 
1.2  A participatory planning process involving all stakeholders is agreed 
upon 
1.3  The AgDB management and the stakeholders agree on the mandate 






2.  Adequate reform strategies are worked out: 
2.1  Alternative reform strategies are examined including: 
2.2  government-owned AgDB under autonomous management 
2.3  government-owned AgDB under commercial bank management 
2.4  full or partial privatization 
2.5  transformation of microbanking operations into user-owned local 
financial institutions  
2.6  closure or fusion 
2.7  Appropriate reform strategies are selected 
2.8  Adequate process technologies are developed 
2.9  Implementation phases of the reform process are determined and 
periodically revised 
2.10  Logistic support of multilateral institutions is secured 
2.11  Reform strategies of international financial institutions are coordinated 
 
3.  The planning process is implemented: 
3.1  A feasibility study is carried out 
3.2  An operational plan for the implementation of the reform process is 
prepared 
3.3  External technical and financial support of the reform process is 
mobilized and coordinated 
3.4  The process of restructuring and reform is monitored 
 
4.  Operational autonomy is effective:  
4.1  The AgDB is granted operational autonomy 
4.2  A commercially experienced, politically independent general manager 
is appointed 
4.3  The Central Bank or Bank Superintendency enforces the attainment 
of operational autonomy 
 
5.  An appropriate legal and regulatory framework is provided: 
5.1  A dialogue is initiated on the policy, legal and regulatory framework 
conducive to AgDB reform 
5.2  The ADB law is revised 
5.3  Politically motivated loan forgiveness is excluded by law 
5.4  Prudential norms are defined and enforced 
 
6.  The AgDB’s finances are restructured: 
6.1  The portfolio is cleaned 
6.2  The bank is recapitalized 
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7.  The bank structure is reorganized: 
7.1  Microfinance services are organized in an autonomous corporate 
division 
7.2  Savings deposits are recycled among the microfinance units 
7.3  Branches are decentralized into profit centers 
7.4  The branch network is expanded 
7.5  Outreach is expanded to the poor and their self-help groups 
1.  
8.  Effective delivery schemes are operational: 
8.1  Viable wholesale schemes are operational 
8.2  Linkages with self-help groups, informal financial institutions and 
NGOs are initiated if feasible 
8.3  Viable retail schemes are operational 
 
9.  Effective financial services are offered according to demand:  
9.1  Savings are mobilized through appropriate savings products and 
collection services 
9.2  Interest rates on savings are adequate, with positive real returns 
9.3  Credit products with appropriate terms and collection services are 
provided 
9.4  Insurance and other financial products are provided 
 
10. Financial sustainability is attained: 
10.1 Viability is attained through adequate interest rate spreads and 
adequate repayment performance 
10.2 Self-reliance is attained through savings mobilization and retained 
earnings 
10.3 Financial self-sustainability is attained through adequate returns on 
capital 
 
11. Human resources are developed: 
11.1  Staff selection procedures are established for the hiring of appropriate 
staff 
11.2 Training and retraining schemes are established to inculcate the 
reformed operational practices 
11.3  Staff training and retraining is implemented on a continuous basis 
11.4  Staff incentive schemes are operational 
11.5  A performance-based staff testing and promotion system is 
established 
 
12. Internal and external supervision are effective: 
12.1  International accounting standards are operational 
12.2  Prudential norms are observed 
12.3 A MIS with effective on-time monitoring of loans and prompt action 
taken is operational 
12.4  Internal supervision is operational 
12.5  External supervision is operational 
12.6  Effective supervision services to wholesale clients are provided by the 
AgDB 
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